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ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF VOLUNTARY  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 
 
Luis Inaraja Vera* 
 
Abstract 
In recent years, government agencies have increasingly relied on 
voluntary programs to achieve a variety of goals, from improving worker 
safety to creating healthier living conditions in urban areas. This type of 
government initiative is based on a bargain between the agency and 
private citizens: the government provides certain incentives—economic or 
otherwise—and private actors voluntarily adopt behaviors that benefit the 
public. One example is cleaning up a contaminated site and building an 
affordable housing project. 
While agencies have made substantial progress since the creation of 
the first voluntary programs, much work remains. To move forward in this 
area, and especially with voluntary environmental programs, two critical 
questions must be answered: First, how should we evaluate the 
performance of voluntary environmental programs? And second, how do 
we determine the appropriate level of government—federal, state, or 
local—that should be in charge of implementing them? These two 
questions have not been satisfactorily addressed to date. 
This Article addresses these lingering questions by evaluating the 
performance of a sophisticated local voluntary cleanup program. The 
resulting analysis uncovers some of the shortcomings in how agencies and 
scholars have previously assessed voluntary programs, yielding four 
contributions to the literature. First, the Article offers a deeper 
understanding of how data can and should affect the design and 
improvement of regulatory programs. Second, the examination of a local 
voluntary cleanup program provides much-needed empirical support for 
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a common argument raised in the environmental federalism literature: 
that the need to tailor programs to local conditions can justify a strong 
municipal role. The need for a strong local government is especially 
important where state legislation creates what this Article refers to as 
“local regulatory gaps.” Third, while efficiency is a desirable feature of 
any government initiative, it becomes a necessity in the context of 
voluntary programs. Delays and other inefficiencies in the operation of a 
voluntary program can deter potential enrollees from participating in it. 
Without enrollees, voluntary cleanup programs simply cannot operate. 
Lastly, injecting unnecessary complexity into the design of voluntary 
programs by trying to address too many policy challenges at once can be 
counterproductive. 
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Environmental law at the federal and state levels is becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, as the growing popularity of voluntary or incentives programs 
suggests.1 Consider hazardous substance contamination, one of the most important 
environmental problems of our time.2 Both legislatures and agencies have adopted 
                                               
1 See Xiang Bi & Madhu Khanna, Reassessment of the Impact of the EPA’s Voluntary 
33/50 Program on Toxic Releases, 88 LAND ECON. 341, 341 (2012) (pointing out that, 
starting in the 1990s, voluntary programs have gained traction compared to more traditional 
command-and-control regulation); infra Section I.A (explaining the evolution of 
environmental regulatory tools and the emergence of voluntary programs).  
2 Contaminated sites can cause a variety of problems ranging from urban sprawl to 
serious public health concerns. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the 
Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 59 (1999) (noting that 
avoiding brownfields leads to sprawl). Communities in areas with a higher density of 
contaminated properties experience higher mortality rates resulting from the increased 
likelihood of suffering different types of health problems. See, e.g., Jill S. Litt et al., 
Examining Urban Brownfields Through the Public Health “Macroscope,” 110.2 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 183, 189 (2002); see also infra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text 
(addressing the magnitude of this problem).  
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groundbreaking tools to tackle this environmental challenge. The main federal 
statute designed to address existing hazardous substance contamination, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or the Superfund Law),3 has been described by scholars as the “most far-
reaching of all the environmental statutes” and one that “transformed environmental 
law.”4 CERCLA’s significance is all the more remarkable when considering that the 
statute was enacted in 1980, whereas the European Union did not enact a similar 
framework until 2004.5  
At the state and local levels, legislatures and agencies have developed a suite 
of sophisticated instruments to deal with both hazardous substance contamination 
and other complex environmental problems, such as programs that rely on voluntary 
behavior by private actors to achieve a particular policy goal.6 One of the federal 
predecessors of these state initiatives is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration’s (OSHA) Voluntary Protection Program, which removed certain 
facilities from the agency’s routine inspection list as long as the sites’ operators 
implemented a health and safety management system, agreed to improve workplace 
safety, and passed an initial inspection.7 
State voluntary programs typically follow the same core principle adopted by 
the OSHA Voluntary Protection Program: if the agency provides the right 
incentives, the private sector will adopt behaviors that are beneficial to the public.8 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs (“VCPs”), the quintessential environmental state 
voluntary initiative, address the two main hurdles that real estate developers who 
wish to purchase a site that may be contaminated face. First, taking title to the 
property can often make the buyer automatically liable for the contamination.9 
Second, cleanup costs can be very high—easily in the hundreds of thousands or 
millions of dollars—and also relatively complicated to estimate with precision 
                                               
3 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. 
No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018)). 
4 Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States 
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three Decades in the United 
States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 85 (2001); Justin R. Pidot & Dale Ratliff, The Common Law 
of Liable Party CERCLA Claims, 70 STAN. L. REV. 191, 194 (2018).  
5 See Directive 2004/35, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 
2004 on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56. 
6 See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing voluntary cleanup programs at a state and local 
level). 
7 See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons 
from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s “Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 15 (2014).  
8 See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing how voluntary state programs typically follow the 
OSHA principle). 
9 See infra Section II.A (discussing this type of liability and cases where the purchaser 
did not contribute to contamination at the site or migration of contaminants to other 
properties).  
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before the remediation starts, which typically happens after the developer has 
already acquired the property.10 As a prominent scholar put it, this framework 
“makes it an act of heroism to purchase a [contaminated] site.”11 VCPs typically 
seek to incentivize prospective buyers of contaminated properties to purchase them, 
clean them up, and put them to use. To such end, these programs provide liability 
protections to those who agree to remediate the site under the supervision of the state 
environmental agency, and they also offer financial assistance for the cleanup, 
generally in the form of grants or tax incentives.12 The state, on the other hand, 
“receives the increased tax revenue from the redevelopment [and] improved 
environmental quality for its citizens, and conserves state enforcement resources.”13 
The way this process operates in practice is: the developer buys the land, applies to 
enroll the site in the program, and, if the application is successful, the state will 
oversee the cleanup until it is complete.14  
Despite the proliferation of complex regulatory tools such as voluntary 
programs, there still remains a lot of work to be done. According to recent estimates, 
there are in excess of half a million contaminated sites in the United States,15 
covering approximately 23 million acres of land—an area comparable to that of the 
State of Indiana.16 To address these issues effectively, however, legislators and 
agencies need more specific answers to two critical questions that the literature has 
largely ignored: (i) How can we improve voluntary programs?; and (ii) What is the 
appropriate level of government to implement them? 
To answer the first question, agencies must first evaluate their programs to 
identify potential areas of improvement. The practical problem that program 
assessment poses in the context of voluntary programs, however, is that evaluating 
these particularly complex government initiatives has proved very challenging.17 
                                               
10 See infra Section II.B (addressing the significant barriers to brownfield 
redevelopment).  
11 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 296 (1997).  
12 See infra Section II.A.3 (discussing state and local cleanup programs and their use of 
financial assistance through tax incentives). 
13 See Matthew D. Fortney, Comment, Devolving Control over Mildly Contaminated 
Property: The Local Cleanup Program, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1863, 1873 (2006).  
14 See, e.g., Section IV. A (discussing New York City’s voluntary cleanup program). 
15 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND: MAKING A 
VISIBLE DIFFERENCE IN COMMUNITIES 3 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND]; see also Robert A. Simmons, How Many Urban 
Brownfields Are Out There? An Economic Base Contraction Analysis of 31 U.S. Cities, 2 
PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 267, 273 (1998) (estimating, many years earlier, that the 
number of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more).  
16 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 
15, at 3.  
17 See Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve 
Environmental Quality, 22 ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 157, 160 (2002) (highlighting how 
lack of baselines can complicate these assessments); Jonathan C. Borck & Cary Coglianese, 
Voluntary Environmental Programs: Assessing Their Effectiveness, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T 
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VCPs, for example, often have a wide variety of goals, but the available data on their 
operation are typically insufficient to assess their overall success.18  
The Article’s central claim is that, as a result, scholars have tried to reach 
conclusions on VCPs’ overall performance by focusing not on the programs’ core 
objectives, but instead on subsidiary goals that are easier to evaluate.19 Without an 
adequate answer to the question of how to evaluate and improve these programs, it 
is extremely difficult to determine which level of government, or combination 
thereof, is in the best position to address the soil contamination problem. This 
uncertainty may help explain why debates about federalism in the environmental 
law literature have thus far been mostly theoretical.20  
This Article addresses these shortcomings in the literature by examining a real-
world example of a VCP: New York City’s Voluntary Cleanup Program (“NYC 
VCP”). VCPs provide for interesting case studies because, although they are 
complex and sophisticated, they remain untested in a meaningful way. The NYC 
VCP was chosen for this analysis for different reasons. It is of recent adoption, 
widely used, and operates in a geographic area where data on soil contamination is 
plentiful. This made it possible to evaluate whether the program was meeting its 
central goal, that is, spurring the redevelopment of contaminated sites.21 Moreover, 
                                               
RESOURCES 305, 315 (2009) (noting that the literature evaluating the effect of voluntary 
environmental programs beyond questions relating to participation is scarce). 
18 See infra Sections III.A and III.B; Richard C. Hula & Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, 
Cleaning Up the Mess: Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 276, 279 
(2010) (noting that “the literature has yet to determine whether [brownfield redevelopment] 
initiatives lead to improvements in brownfields over time”); see also Joel B. Eisen, 
“Brownfields of Dreams?”: Challenges and Limits of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and 
Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 990 (noting that state voluntary cleanup statutes are 
“too new for their effectiveness to be measured accurately”).  
19 See infra Section III.A. 
20 See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching 
Principle: The Case for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (“The Matching Principle suggests that, in general, the size of the 
geographic area affected by a specific pollution source should determine the appropriate 
governmental level for responding to the pollution.”); Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative 
Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 
1034 n.47 (2007) (“[E]nvironmental protection is increasingly a local government issue.”); 
Fortney, supra note 13, at 1890–96 (laying out the arguments in support of local cleanup 
programs); Jared Snyder & Jonathan Binder, The Changing Climate of Cooperative 
Federalism: The Dynamic Role of the States in a National Strategy to Combat Climate 
Change, 27 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 231, 247 (2009) (“While the climate change crisis 
may differ from other environmental problems in many ways, it is similar in that the best 
approach to mitigate and adapt to the problem requires a comprehensive approach involving 
multiple levels of government.”). 
21 See LUIS INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., MAKING DIRTY LAND CLEAN: AN 
ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK CITY’S VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM 3 (2018) [hereinafter 
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the NYC VCP is the first and only VCP run by a local government agency, which 
allows this Article to shed some light on the role that local governments can play in 
this domain.22 
The analysis in this Article yields four contributions to the literature. First, it 
provides a deeper understanding of how data can and should affect the design of 
voluntary environmental programs.23 Of course, in the context of VCPs, knowing 
more about the location of environmental hazards from these additional data can 
definitely help citizens reduce their exposure to dangerous pollutants. Less 
obviously, having more comprehensive and accurate environmental data has the 
additional benefit of allowing for more thorough assessments of the performance of 
government programs.24 Improved assessments, in turn, make it easier for agencies 
to modify their programs and make them more effective. 
Second, the study of the first local VCP offers important lessons on how to best 
structure collaboration between the various levels of government that participate in 
the implementation of voluntary programs. Specifically, this analysis provides direct 
support for a common argument raised in the federalism literature: that the need to 
tailor programs to local conditions justifies a strong local government role.25 With 
VCPs, state legislation can create a local regulatory gap that affects specific 
municipalities; for instance, by making sites located in a particular city ineligible to 
join a state cleanup program.26 When this occurs, it becomes crucial for state 
legislatures to give municipal governments enough authority to allow them to create 
local programs that address environmental cleanup issues effectively.27 
                                               
INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR]; see also infra Section IV.A (analyzing New York 
City’s VCP in detail).  
22 See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 14; see also infra Section 
IV.A (explaining the basic features of New York City’s VCP). 
23 See infra Section V.A; see also Emily A. Green, The Rustbelt and the Revitalization 
of Detroit: A Commentary and Criticism of Michigan Brownfield Legislation, 5 J.L. SOC’Y 
571, 605–14 (2004). 
24 See infra Section V.A; see also Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in 
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 168 (2005) (“The lack of data can 
inhibit sound policy formation at all levels of government.”). 
25 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 24, at 137 (2005) (“A more decentralized system is better 
able to overcome this ‘knowledge problem,’ and ensure that regulatory measures take 
account of local conditions.”); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of 
Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 415 (2002) (“The diversity of 
local conditions . . . suggests that centralized approaches to environmental protection are not 
necessarily desirable when dealing with environmental problems.”). 
26 For an example of this problem, see infra Section IV.A. 
27 In the VCP context, this often requires allowing enrollees in a local program to have 
the same liability protections that those in a state-level VCP would enjoy. See infra Section 
V.B. 
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Third, efficiency is a critical feature of voluntary programs.28 While having 
government initiatives that are efficient is generally desirable, in the context of 
voluntary programs it is a necessity.29 As this Article shows, perceived inefficiencies 
and delays in the operation of a voluntary program can deter potential enrollees from 
participating in it.30 Without enrollees, a voluntary program cannot operate. 
Interviews with actors who have repeatedly used VCPs strongly suggest that the 
predictability of the program and the general swiftness with which the agency 
responds to requests and keeps the process moving forward can dramatically affect 
the willingness of enrollees to use the program in the future.31  
Lastly, injecting more complexity into the design of voluntary programs can be 
counterproductive. As Professor Richard Epstein noted in his seminal book “Simple 
Rules for a Complex World,” overly complicated rules can have a negative impact 
on “the productive efficiency of the society they regulate.”32 Given that there is no 
shortage of environmental problems, it can be tempting to try to address multiple 
issues at once in the same program. VCPs are perceived as a tool that could 
potentially be used to incentivize the development of solar installations on 
contaminated sites and help combat climate change.33 This Article cautions against 
blindly favoring this type of redevelopment at the expense of other beneficial uses, 
such as housing and recreational uses. The technical literature makes it clear that 
there is no obvious comparative advantage to using contaminated sites for solar 
energy generation.34 Moreover, including provisions in a VCP that promote this 
particular activity can upset the fragile balance of incentives that the various levels 
                                               
28 Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 173–74 (addressing the key role of efficiency 
in the context of environmental voluntary programs); Green, supra note 23, at 605 
(explaining that voluntary programs in Ohio and Michigan would benefit from specific 
measures that would increase their efficiency).  
29 See Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 173–74; Green, supra note 23, at 596–
97; see also infra Section V.C. 
30 See Tracy A. Hudak, Addressing Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment: An 
Analysis of CERCLA and the Voluntary Cleanup Programs of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and 
Michigan 23 (Apr. 19, 2002) (major paper for the degree of Master of Urban and Regional 
Planning, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on file with the Utah Law 
Review); see also infra Section V.C. 
31 See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 1, 5. 
32 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 307. 
33 See Silvio Marcacci, Solar Brightfields: Gigawatts of Clean Energy Potential on 
America’s Landfills and Brownfields, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2017, 08:55 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/08/10/solar-brightfields-gigawatts-of-
clean-energy-potential-on-americas-landfills-and-brownfields/#45f10b4b6f54 [https://perm 
a.cc/LE5G-49ZV]; Robert B. Warren, The Benefits of Brightfields Developments for 
Municipalities, WEIRFOULDS LLP NEWSLETTER (WeirFoulds LLP, Toronto, ON, Canada), 
June 2016, https://www.weirfoulds.com/the-benefits-of-brightfields-developments-for-
municipalities [https://perma.cc/ZB6R-DYXV]. 
34 See infra Section V.D. 
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of government—federal, state, and local—have crafted for all the different land 
uses.35 
This Article’s contributions have implications for a number of different fields. 
Agencies have set up voluntary programs not only to incentivize the cleanup and 
redevelopment of contaminated sites but also to promote land conservation, reduce 
the impacts of farming activities, and to improve the safety of workers, to name a 
few.36 Moreover, the control of hazardous substance contamination is also tied to 
other key environmental problems of our time, such as climate change. Climate-
related risks associated with contaminated properties are especially apparent with 
sites located in flood zones, which are becoming an increasing source of concern as 
these low-lying areas flood more and more frequently.37 Further, as noted above, 
policymakers are currently evaluating the extent to which it is advisable to promote 
the use of contaminated properties to host renewable energy installations and 
ultimately reduce the generation of greenhouse gases.38  
Implementing the principles outlined in this Article has become particularly 
urgent. In the current political environment, it is unlikely that the federal government 
will take the lead in creating new innovative and far-reaching regulatory programs 
or that it will dedicate more resources to environmental enforcement.39 Therefore, 
voluntary programs are a critical piece in the puzzle to provide a more viable 
                                               
35 See infra Section V.D. 
36 See, e.g., Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 15 (describing OSHA’s voluntary 
program to increase worker safety); Sherry A. Enzler, EPA-Minnesota AG Certainty 
Program—Is It Up to the Task of Cleaning Our Waters?, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 959, 
959–61 (2013) (explaining how agencies use voluntary programs to reduce agricultural 
pollution); Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral 
Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 542–43 (2006) (noting how financial 
incentives—a tool designed to elicit voluntary action—are used in the land conservation 
context). 
37 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELD REVITALIZATION IN 
CLIMATE-VULNERABLE AREAS: COMMUNITY-BASED EXAMPLES FOR IMPROVING 
ORDINANCE REGULATIONS, DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES, PROGRAMS, AND PROJECTS (2016) 
(addressing the challenges of redeveloping contaminated sites in areas subject to flooding), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-01/documents/bf_revitalization_climate_ 
vulnerable_areas_012616_508_v2_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VWL-EWWW]. These 
initiatives, however, may be encouraging investment in areas where redevelopment is 
undesirable given their risk of flooding. See Katrina M. Wyman & Nicholas R. Williams, 
Migrating Boundaries, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1957, 1991 (2013) (noting the dangers of 
incentivizing overinvestment in areas prone to flooding). 
38 See, e.g., Parking Lot Solar Canopy Installation, EMPIRE RENEWABLE ENERGY, LLC, 
http://solarbyempire.com/why-solar/solar-options/118-parking-lot-canopies [https://perma. 
cc/9DWL-N8E4] (last visited Jan. 5, 2020). 
39 See Joel A. Mintz, It’s Official: Trump’s Policies Deter EPA Staff from Enforcing 
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alternative to mandatory regulation. Moreover, it is essential to structure 
collaborations among various levels of government so that states and cities can adopt 
a leading role in addressing a variety of environmental problems.40  
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates the emergence of voluntary 
programs within the history and evolution of environmental law. Part II examines 
the different approaches to dealing with third-generation environmental problems, 
such as the recalcitrant presence of contaminated sites in many communities. It then 
explores how Congress amended federal legislation in 2018 to tackle some of these 
issues and how state agencies have opted for the alternative approach of creating 
voluntary programs. Part III identifies the practical challenges that agencies and 
academics face when attempting to evaluate the success of voluntary programs and 
uncovers critical gaps in the literature. Part IV proposes a new analytical framework 
to determine whether voluntary programs are meeting their most important goal—
incentivizing private actors’ actions—and puts it to the test with the most 
sophisticated municipal VCP in the nation. Finally, Part V lays out a set of 
recommendations that policymakers can use to make voluntary programs more 
effective and efficient. It also provides guidance on how to better structure 
collaboration between different levels of government in a way that maximizes these 
programs’ success. 
 
I.  THE GROWING COMPLEXITY AND SOPHISTICATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
A.  The First and Second Generations of Environmental Law 
 
Scholars often use the term “generations” to refer to the different historical 
stages of environmental regulation.41 For example, federal statutes such as the Clean 
Air Act are typically viewed as part of the first generation of environmental law, 
whereas state programs adopting flexible market-oriented approaches are more 
aligned with what scholars regard as the second generation.42 It is worth noting, 
however, that different scholars may include the same statute or regulatory tool in a 
different category, depending on the main feature they use to distinguish between 
these two generations.43 In some cases, scholars will base this determination on the 
level of government that is primarily tasked with implementing the statute (i.e., 
federal for first generation or state for second generation) and, in others, on the 
                                               
40 See supra note 28 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the literature 
supporting a stronger role of local governments in addressing environmental problems).  
41 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 
570, 600, 605 (1996) (using the first- and second- generation terminology with regard to 
environmental law); Lazarus, supra note 4, at 75, 77, 87 (alluding to first and second 
generations of environmental laws). 
42 See infra Section I.A.2.  
43 See Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. 137, 150–51 (2019). 
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specific type of instrument on which the program relies (e.g., command-and-control 
regulation as first generation or market-based tools as second generation).44  
 
1.  The Pre-Generational Era 
 
Societies have been working to address environmental problems for a very long 
time. In Ancient Greece, for example, certain ordinances tried to reduce noise 
pollution by requiring that roosters and tinsmiths be located outside the city limits.45 
More recently, and until the 1970s, tort actions were the main avenue to address 
environmental issues.46 Some have gone so far as to claim that, prior to 1970, 
“environmental protection law in the United States was essentially nonexistent.”47 
This is in part because there was no agency tasked with environmental protection at 
the federal level at the time, but also because tort causes of action had not been 
effective in dealing with a variety of environmental problems; for example, those in 
which “private parties [were] incapable of paying for the full magnitude of the harm” 
they caused.48  
The issue of soil contamination, due to its magnitude and economic impact, was 
one of the triggers of more comprehensive federal regulation. Soil polluting 
activities (e.g., manufacturing, waste disposal, illegal dumping, and accidental 
spills49) are ubiquitous. There are in excess of 530,000 contaminated sites in the 
United States50 covering approximately 23 million acres of land—an area 
                                               
44 Compare Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 
CAP. U.L. REV. 21, 21 (2001) (basing that distinction on the type of instrument used), with 
Esty, supra note 41, at 600–12 (defining the two generations based on whether environmental 
regulation was more or less centralized); see also infra Section I.A.2. 
45 Luis Inaraja Vera, How Science Can Improve Regulation: Noise Control in Urban 
Areas, 53 TULSA L. REV. 33, 36 (2017).  
46 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 41, at 600 (discussing the difficulty in relying on tort 
remedies as a pollution control strategy).  
47 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 76. It is worth noting, however, that states and cities started 
enacting statutes and ordinances to address certain environmental issues in their jurisdictions 
long before 1970. See Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban 
Environmental Renaissance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (NYU School of Law, 
Public Law Research Paper No. 19-08) (manuscript at 10–18), https://ssrn.com/abstract=336 
0548 [https://perma.cc/GRF2-3E43] (showing that Congress passed a series of landmark 
environmental statutes in the 1970s).  
48 See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 357, 360 (1984); Wyman & Spiegel-Feld, supra note 47. 
49 Report on the Environment: Contaminated Land: What Are the Trends in 
Contaminated Land and Their Effects on Human Health and the Environment?, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/report-environment/contaminated-land [https://perma 
.cc/94DE-Z6X7] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
50 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 15, at 
3; see also Simmons, supra note 15, at 273 (estimating, many years earlier, that the number 
of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more).  
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comparable to that of the State of Indiana.51 Thus, it is not surprising that the failure 
of the existing legal framework—mostly tort law—to adequately deal with the 
effects of soil contamination became a catalyst for change.  
During the Love Canal disaster in the 1970s, the inadequacy of tort-based 
solutions became evident. This incident, which has been described as “one of the 
most appalling environmental tragedies in American history,” showed the world 
why the combination of insufficient regulation, residential uses, and unaddressed 
soil contamination could lead to catastrophic results.52 William Love, an 
entrepreneur who arrived in the Niagara Falls area in the 1890s, had the ambitious 
idea to construct a several-mile-long navigable canal in the Niagara River to 
generate power for local industry.53 After the excavation of a considerable amount 
of soil, the project was halted, which left an empty 16-acre canal that Hooker 
Electrochemical Company (“Hooker”) and other local industries later used to 
dispose of their chemical waste.54 Hooker then capped the site and sold it to the 
Niagara County Board of Education.55 During the next few years, a school and 
approximately one hundred residences were built in the surrounding area.56  
While the presence of homes in an area adjacent to an uncontrolled chemical 
waste dumpsite was enough cause for concern, certain developments made this 
situation even worse. In the 1970s, heavy rainfall increased the groundwater level 
and mobilized the hazardous substances located in the canal, which, in some cases, 
ended up in the basements of nearby residences in the form of “oily sludge.”57 Many 
residents became exposed to hazardous chemicals in the sludge and experienced a 
myriad of health problems, including miscarriages, birth defects, and cancer.58 To 
address the public health crisis, the State of New York bought 734 residences and, 
along with the federal government, spent more than $250 million on relocation and 
cleanup.59 Love Canal made clear that a more effective approach was needed to 
address untreated hazardous waste dumps and other environmental problems. 
                                               
51 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 
15, at 3.  
52 Eckardt C. Beck, The Love Canal Tragedy, 5 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY J. 17, 17 (1979). 
53 Theodore Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 
ENVTL. L. 133, 135 (1980). 
54 See Barbara Ann White, Economizing on the Sins of Our Past: Cleaning Up Our 
Hazardous Wastes, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 899, 923–24 (1988) (citing ADELINE GORDON LEVINE, 
LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 9–12 (1982)). 
55 LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES 21 (1998). 
56 Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy 
of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 473 (2007). 
57 Lori A. Kosakowski, The Inclusion of Passive Migration Under CERCLA Liability: 
When Is Disposal Truly Disposal, 37 VAL. U.L. REV. 293, 296 (2002). 
58 DAN FAGIN, TOMS RIVER: A STORY OF SCIENCE AND SALVATION 129 (2013). 
59 Lynn E. Richter, AM International v. International Forging Equipment: Does 
CERCLA Allow Private Parties to Contractually Allocate Liability for Cleaning Up 
Contaminated Sites, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 1065, 1069–70 (1991). 
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2.  The First Generation of Environmental Law 
 
Starting in the early 1970s, the legal landscape changed dramatically with the 
enactment of a variety of federal statutes aimed at protecting the environment and 
human health, including the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, 
the Clean Water Act, and the Endangered Species Act.60 This “first generation” of 
environmental law had two distinctive features. First, it relied on so-called 
command-and-control regulation,61 which imposes both the goals that the regulated 
parties must achieve—e.g., ensuring that the emissions of a particular pollutant stay 
below the specified standard—and the means they must employ to attain them—
e.g., using a particular technology.62 Second, first-generation environmental statutes 
adopted a centralized approach; that is, they assigned a prominent role to the federal 
government in setting the different regulatory standards.63 Scholars have provided 
multiple justifications for federally oriented environmental regulation, including the 
desirability of taking advantage of national economies of scale and the need to avoid 
the effect of “spillover impacts of decisions in one jurisdiction on well-being in other 
jurisdictions.”64 
Returning to the soil contamination example, the Love Canal catastrophe and 
similar incidents led Congress in 1980 to enact what one of the nation’s leading 
environmental law scholars calls “the most far reaching of all the environmental 
statutes”: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”).65 Interestingly, whether this statute is part of the first or 
                                               
60 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–
4370m-12 (2018)); Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q); Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388); Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544); see also Lazarus, supra note 4, at 77–78. 
61 Incentive-based regulation, on the other hand, is often tied to a “second generation” 
of environmental law. See, e.g., Craig Anthony Arnold, Environmental Law, Episode IV: A 
New Hope? Can Environmental Law Adapt for Resilient Communities and Ecosystems?, 21 
J. ENVTL. & SUSTAINABILITY L. 1, 8 (2015). 
62 See Daniel H. Cole, Explaining the Persistence of “Command-and-Control” in US 
Environmental Law, in POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Kenneth R. 
Richards & Josephine van Zeben eds., forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2–3), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024177 [https://perma.cc/UVT9-SZLY]. 
63 See Esty, supra note 41, at 601–02; Stewart, supra note 44, at 21. 
64 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 
1211, 1215 (1977). 
65 The other examples mentioned by Congress were “the Valley of the Drums, 
Occidental Chemical Company’s pesticide formulation site in Lathrop, California, and the 
Chemical Control site in Elizabeth, New Jersey.” Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law 
Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 189 
(1996). Congress’s concern about the Love Canal incident is apparent in the Act itself, which 
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second generation of environmental law is a disputed question. Professor Richard 
Lazarus considers it part of a second wave of environmental regulation because, 
unlike the Clean Air Act or Clean Water Act, which target pollution on a particular 
medium (i.e., air and water), statutes such as CERCLA focus, instead, on specific 
types of pollutants (i.e., hazardous substances).66 Professors Richard Stewart and 
Daniel Esty, on the other hand, consider CERCLA to be a first generation statute 
because it adopts a centralized approach to regulation by giving broad power to the 
federal government as opposed to reserving it for the states, which, according to 
their framework, is a distinctive feature of second generation statutes.67  
The dispute over its generational classification aside, CERCLA’s far-reaching 
reputation is owed in part to its adoption of a broad liability framework that does not 
incorporate a causation requirement.68 Section 107 of CERCLA and its 
implementing regulations promote this expansive approach to liability by adopting 
a broad and all-encompassing definition of “potentially responsible party.”69 Those 
who owned or operated an activity on a property at the time when hazardous 
substances were released may, not surprisingly, be deemed liable for the release.70 
However, Section 107 includes a variety of additional potentially responsible 
parties.71 The most relevant, for the purposes of the discussion in this Section, are 
current owners of the property, even if they acquired the property after the 
contamination was already in place and did not contribute to its release or spread in 
any way.72  
The absence of a causation requirement for potentially responsible parties was 
confirmed in New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,73 where the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
                                               
contains a provision specifically devoted to the “Love Canal property acquisition.” See 42 
U.S.C. § 9661 (2018).  
66 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 83. 
67 Esty, supra note 41, at 602; Stewart, supra note 44, at 21–23, 23 n.2. 
68 Amy Luria, CERCLA Contribution: An Inquiry into What Constitutes an 
Administrative Settlement, 84 N.D. L. REV. 333, 333–34 (2008). 
69 40 C.F.R. § 304.12(m) (2018); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
70 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2); see 40 C.F.R. § 304.12(m) (potentially responsible parties 
include “any person who may be liable pursuant to section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
9607(a)”). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). These provisions are typically broader and, in addition to current 
owners and operators, also include “(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any 
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances 
were disposed of, (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for 
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances . . . and (4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous 
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites 
selected by such person.” Id. (emphasis added). 
72 Unless the current owner can claim one of the statutory defenses, such as the innocent 
landowner defense recognized in Sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35). See 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601(35), 9607(b)(3).  
73 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985). 
 
2020] VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 809 
 
the Second Circuit pointed out that the statute does not require a plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant caused the contamination.74 Shore Realty Corp. (“Shore”) 
purchased a 3.2-acre site heavily contaminated with hazardous substances, intending 
to use it as a condominium development.75 The State of New York incurred a series 
of costs in connection with the cleanup of the contaminated property and then sought 
to recover them from Shore, the current owner, under Section 107 of CERCLA.76 
Shore argued that it was not liable because it did not own the site at the time when 
the release of hazardous substances occurred.77 The court disagreed and held that 
CERCLA “unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility 
from which there [was] a release or threat of release [of hazardous substances], 
without regard to causation.”78 
The Second Circuit’s interpretation that CERCLA imposes strict liability, 
which was later partially endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court,79 gave the federal 
government, states, and private parties a very powerful tool to overcome some of 
the existing obstacles to recovering cleanup costs.80 The first obstacle that agencies 
face is determining with certainty which of the past owners of a piece of land 
contributed to its contamination, which can be challenging. To make matters worse, 
some of these entities may no longer exist or may be insolvent. The statute addresses 
these issues by allowing plaintiffs to require the current owner to pay these cleanup 
costs.81 
 
3.  The Decentralization Era and the Environmental Federalism Debate 
 
One of the reactions to the federal environmental regulation model adopted in 
the 1970s and 1980s was a subsequent movement towards a more decentralized, 
second-generation approach, in which states could play a more prominent role.82 
Advocates of this position responded to the concerns that had initially justified the 
centralized approach of the first generation. One of these justifications was based on 
                                               
74 Id. at 1044–45. 
75 Id. at 1038. 
76 Id. at 1032–43.  
77 Id. at 1043. 
78 Id. at 1044 (emphasis added). 
79 See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 712 
(1995) (citing New York v. Shore Realty Corp. 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, n.17 (2d Cir. 1985) to 
support the proposition that “‘traditional tort law has often imposed strict liability while 
recognizing a causation defense,’ but that, in enacting [CERCLA], Congress ‘specifically 
rejected including a causation requirement.’”). 
80 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (2018) (listing, as potential plaintiffs, “the United 
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe . . . [or] any other person.”). 
81 Those intending to recover under this section must have incurred removal, remedial, 
or response costs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B); United States v. Atlantic Research 
Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 139 (2007). 
82 See Esty, supra note 41, at 605. 
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the fear of a race-to-the-bottom—that is, that the lack of federal regulation would 
lead smaller units of government, such as states, to adopt lax environmental 
standards to attract industry and economic activity.83 Those in favor of 
decentralization responded to this concern by pointing out that states also have an 
incentive to compete for higher environmental quality with neighboring areas, which 
would lead them to adopt stringent regulatory standards.84  
Returning to the context of hazardous substances, CERCLA is a good example 
of a statute that, while preserving a central role for the federal government, also 
adopts a relatively decentralized approach. To achieve this goal, CERCLA contains 
a provision recognizing that the liability for releases of hazardous substances under 
state law is not affected by the Act.85 In addition to not displacing or preempting 
state law, CERCLA expressly contemplates, and in some cases requires, an 
important role for the states in implementing the statute.86 For example, Section 107 
of the act authorizes states to recover costs incurred in connection with the cleanup 
up of a site.87  
Another reason to view CERCLA as part of the decentralization effort is that it 
has led to the enactment of state-specific provisions governing liability for releases 
of hazardous substances.88 These statutes generally mirror CERCLA’s liability 
approach, but in some cases they have deviated from the federal standard.89 This 
raises two important questions.  
First, the existence of both federal and state liability frameworks can lead to 
challenging scenarios in which a potentially liable party could be held liable for 
                                               
83 See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 605–06 (2001) (explaining the basis for this argument).  
84 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race 
to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 
1233–44 (1992). 
85 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). This savings clause, however, is limited by Section 309, relating 
to the statute of limitations of claims under state law. See id. § 9658; Robin Kundis Craig, 
Federalism Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 SW. L. REV. 617, 631 (2012). 
Moreover, there are situations in which courts have found CERCLA to preempt state law 
claims. See Kristi Weiner, Does CERCLA Preempt New York State Law Claims for Cost 
Recovery and Contribution?, 54 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 811, 825–26 (2010); see also PMC, 
Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 618 (7th Cir. 1998) (“CERCLA’s savings clause 
must not be used to gut provisions of CERCLA.”). 
86 Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and 
Indemnity Actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 89 (1994). 
87 The statute also recognizes this right to other parties, such as the federal government 
and private citizens. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (referring to the costs of a removal or 
remedial action incurred by a State). 
88 See ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50-STATE 
STUDY, 2001 UPDATE 13 (2001). New Jersey’s Spill Compensation and Control Act, 
however, preceded CERCLA. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 58:10-23.11 (1976). 
89 See, e.g., infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
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certain cleanup costs under state law but not federal law. This can happen, for 
example, when the applicable state statute does not contemplate a defense to liability 
that CERCLA recognizes.90 In these cases, the state agency or another party may be 
able to recover its cleanup costs even if the potentially liable party would be 
protected from cost recovery or contribution suits brought under federal law 
(because, as pointed out above, CERCLA does not preempt state law).91 Part II 
explains how most states have tempered this result by creating voluntary cleanup 
programs.  
Second, the role that local-level cleanup initiatives can play in this context is 
largely unassessed. The literature has pointed to several reasons that, in theory, 
support increasing the involvement of local governments in cleanup projects. These 
reasons include the need to consider local factors when designing policies to address 
land contamination problems, to have administrative action that originates closer to 
the people, and to experiment with different models in order to determine which 
ones are the most effective.92 The question of whether local programs are desirable, 
however, can only be definitively answered once policymakers have adequate 
assessments of the performance of cleanup programs. Part III of this article examines 
the obstacles that agencies and scholars face when evaluating the success of these 
types of programs.  
 
B.  Third-Generation Environmental Issues: The Brownfield Problem 
 
Some environmental challenges are particularly hard to tackle. Scholars have 
used the terms “third generation” and “next generation” problems to describe 
environmental issues that require a more sophisticated approach than those provided 
by first- and second-generation regulatory tools.93 These types of problems are often 
                                               
90 New York State, for example, does not provide an equivalent to the federal bona fide 
prospective purchaser protection. See Developments in Historic Contamination Liability and 
Cleanup Schemes in the United States, ENVTL. PRAC. BRIEFING (Shearman & Sterling LLP, 




9GBM]. Some courts, however, have found some of these claims to be preempted. See 
Weiner, supra note 85, at 825–26. 
91 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining the basic features of cost-
recovery actions under Section 107 of CERCLA). Contribution actions are governed by 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(f).  
92 See Fortney, supra note 13, at 1892–95; James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform 
Standards in a Federal System—and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1228 (1995); 
Butler & Macey, supra note 20, at 53. 
93 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 4, at 91 (noting how scholars have pointed to the 
necessity of a third generation of environmental law to deal with the environmental problems 
of the next millennium); Stewart, supra note 44, at 21 (pointing out that certain 
environmental challenges require a third-generation strategy). 
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caused by many actors and sources; present ecological, economic, and distributional 
components; and involve contaminants whose cumulative effects are not easy to 
predict in space or time.94 It is important to keep in mind that, in addition to the 
inherent complexity of third and next generation issues, the regulatory framework 
designed to address them can also make matters worse. This Section illustrates these 
challenges by focusing on a category of contaminated sites with which regulators 
are still contending: brownfields. 
 
1.  What Are Brownfields? 
 
Brownfields are properties where “the presence or potential presence” of 
contamination may hinder their “expansion, redevelopment, or reuse.”95 While there 
are other similar definitions of brownfield, the unifying theme is that the likely 
presence of contamination may be impeding the redevelopment of the site.96 
To fully understand the nature of the problem, which the next section addresses 
in more detail, it is important to highlight several features of the definition of 
brownfield used in this Article. First, brownfields need not be vacant.97 Sites whose 
reuse may be complicated by the potential presence of hazardous substances are also 
brownfields. Stated differently, part of the problem with these properties is that their 
contamination may lock the land into continuing the particular use to which they are 
currently being put—typically, industrial uses.98 This is so because switching to a 
different use with a more stringent cleanup standard, such as residential or 
commercial, can entail high remediation costs.99 Moreover, the change in use could 
                                               
94 Lazarus, supra note 4, at 92; Stewart, supra note 44, at 153; J.B. Ruhl & James 
Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: 
A Guide for the Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 75, 78–79 (2010) (explaining that the 
existence of multiple sources and of cumulative effects that are not “proportional over time 
and . . . space” are features of “massive” environmental problems).  
95 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (defining “brownfield site” as “real property, the expansion, 
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence 
of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant”).  
96 For example, the Environmental Protection Agency defines brownfield as 
“abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial facilities where expansion or 
redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental contamination.” United 
States Environmental Protection Agency Grants and Fellowship Information, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/grants/united-states-environmental-protection-
agency-grants-and-fellowship-information [https://perma.cc/MHZ3-XCSP] (last visited Jan. 
12, 2020). 
97 However, many brownfields are, in practice, vacant. Lincoln L. Davies, Note, 
Working Toward a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in 
Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 292 (1999). 
98 The term “vacant” is sometimes used to refer to unused land, with or without 
buildings, and also to land with no structures.  
99 Different uses often have different cleanup standards. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS., tit. 6 § 375-6.8(b) (2019) (requiring different contaminant levels for residential, 
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trigger the involvement of government agencies,100 which landowners often hope to 
avoid given that it may increase their risk of being the recipients of an enforcement 
action.  
Second, brownfields typically have mild to moderate levels of 
contamination.101 Thus, they do not include properties that are heavily polluted, such 
as Love Canal. While drawing the line that separates brownfields from other more 
contaminated sites can be complicated, it is safe to say that sites on the National 
Priorities List (“NPL”), for example, are not brownfields.102 This list includes sites 
that the EPA views as presenting the highest “risk or danger to public health or 
welfare or the environment.”103  
The distinction between brownfields and other contaminated sites has profound 
implications. A property’s level of contamination affects the type of incentives its 
owner or developer may be able to receive. For example, government assistance 
programs designed to incentivize the redevelopment of brownfields typically 
exclude highly contaminated sites.104 Moreover, a site’s contamination levels 
influence both which agencies—federal or state—may initiate an enforcement 
action and their likelihood of doing so. EPA, for instance, brings enforcement 
                                               
restricted-residential, commercial, and industrial uses). Moreover, a change of use may also 
involve a transfer to a different operator. This may trigger reporting or remediation 
obligations under some state statutes. See infra note 121 and accompanying text. 
100 This results from the fact that the change in use will often entail physical 
modifications that require building construction or alteration permits.  
101 William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional 
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 4 n.1 (1997); James A. Kushner, 
Brownfield Redevelopment Strategies in the United States, 22 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 857, 857 
n.1 (2006). 
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(B)(ii) (2018) (excluding NPL sites from the definition of 
brownfield); see also Larry Schnapf, Special Report: State-by-State Survey of Brownfield 
and Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 28 ENV’T REP. 2488, 2488 (1998) (explaining that 
brownfields generally do not present levels of contamination high enough to be included in 
the NPL or state equivalents).  
103 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a)(8)(A) (providing that NPL designation is based on a variety of 
factors, including “the population at risk, the hazard potential of the hazardous substances at 
such facilities, the potential for contamination of drinking water supplies, the potential for 
direct human contact, the potential for destruction of sensitive ecosystems, the damage to 
natural resources which may affect the human food chain and which is associated with any 
release or threatened release, the contamination or potential contamination of the ambient air 
which is associated with the release or threatened release, State preparedness to assume State 
costs and responsibilities, and other appropriate factors”).  
104 See, e.g., 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1402(uu)(1)(A) (2020) (limiting the eligibility of sites 
to join the New York City Voluntary Cleanup Program to properties with “light to moderate 
levels of contamination”). 
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actions in connection with brownfields with a lower frequency than it does with 
respect to more contaminated sites.105  
Last, it is also important to note that, although it may be surprising at first, a 
brownfield may not be contaminated at all. Under Congress’s definition, the 
potential presence of contamination suffices.106 As the next section explains, 
uncertainty over the type and extent of the contamination is one of the factors that 
deter developers from purchasing brownfield sites.107 Therefore, the mere likelihood 
of contamination—determined, for example, based on the site’s current or former 
industrial use—can be enough, on its own, to make the site undesirable for 
redevelopment, and thus a brownfield.  
 
2.  Why Are Brownfields So Problematic? 
 
There are multiple problems associated with having a large number of 
contaminated sites across the country. For one thing, brownfields raise a variety of 
health concerns: their contamination can lead to respiratory, “liver, diabetes, stroke, 
COPD, [and] heart disease.”108 For another, brownfields can contribute to urban 
sprawl, as developers have a tendency to avoid these types of properties—which are 
often located in more central and high-density parts of towns and cities—and instead 
target clean land in lower-density and more peripheral areas.109 
In light of the gravity of the brownfield problem, it is reasonable to wonder why 
first- and second-generation environmental law tools have not effectively addressed 
it.110 A plausible response is that, given that there are over half a million brownfields 
in the United States, the process of cleaning them up will necessarily take many 
decades.111 However, this is only part of the problem. Another hurdle is that, as the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United 
                                               
105 See RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 755–56 (3d ed. 2015) 
[hereinafter REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY] (explaining that contamination 
levels in brownfields is generally insufficient to attract EPA’s attention); Fortney, supra note 
13, at 1865–66 (noting that, in practice, EPA “addresses only the most contaminated sites,” 
and that there are contaminated sites that, because they are not reached by state programs 
either, are still “slipping through the cracks.”).  
106 See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
107 See infra Section I.B.2. Certain properties may be viewed as high risk due to the 
possible activities that the current or former owners carried out to contaminate the soil. For 
example, using the subsurface of a property to dispose of waste presents a risk that hazardous 
substances will migrate. See Joseph A. Schremmer, Getting Past Possession: Subsurface 
Property Disputes as Nuisances, 95 WASH. L. REV. 101, 129–30 (2020) (noting the potential 
impacts associated with the injection of hazardous and non-hazardous fluid wastes). 
108 Litt et al., supra note 2, at 189. 
109 See Buzbee, supra note 2, at 59 (noting that avoiding brownfields leads to sprawl). 
110 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROTECTING & RESTORING LAND, supra note 15, 
at 3; see also Simmons, supra note 15, at 273 (estimating, many years earlier, that the number 
of brownfields in the United States ranged from 500,000 to 600,000, or more). 
111 See Simmons, supra note 15, at 273.  
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States illustrated, equitably allocating liability among the potentially responsible 
parties is extremely challenging.112 Identifying the source of each contaminant can 
be complex, as the hazardous substances in question may have been released into a 
brownfield by different actors over multiple decades.113 Further, the commingling 
and migration of contaminants can lead to cumulative effects, which further 
complicate the apportionment of harms.114  
To have a more complete understanding of the brownfield problem, it is 
important to pay special attention to the specific obstacles that deter their 
redevelopment; namely, the—sometimes uncertain—economic costs of cleaning up 
the property and the potential liability associated with purchasing a brownfield.115 
 
(a)  Economic Deterrents to Redevelopment  
 
Cleaning up a brownfield is generally expensive.116 While the cost obviously 
varies depending on the specific site considered, experts have estimated remediation 
costs to be typically in the $600,000 – $1,000,000 range.117 In addition, developers 
are often reluctant to invest in brownfields because hidden cleanup costs may surface 
                                               
112 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–19 (2009) 
(delving into the difficulties of apportioning cleanup costs in a case with multiple actors and 
a variety of contaminants released over an extended period of time). 
113 See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, 
AND POLICY 450 (2018) (introducing Burlington Northern by observing that hazardous waste 
sites can include “a complex mixture of wastes from many sources”—a problem that is often 
compounded “[w]hen [potentially responsible partie]s who would otherwise shoulder 
significant liability are bankrupt or insolvent”). 
114 Karen D. Holl & Richard B. Howarth, Paying for Restoration, 8 RESTORATION 
ECOLOGY 260, 263 (2000) (explaining that “much environmental damage is caused by 
cumulative effects of many small businesses or individuals”). 
115 See Richard C. Hula & Rebecca Bromley-Trujillo, Cleaning Up the Mess: 
Redevelopment of Urban Brownfields, 24 ECON. DEV. Q. 276, 277 (2010) (presenting 
cleanup costs and potential exposure to liability as two significant barriers that discourage 
developers from investing in brownfields); Linda McCarthy, The Brownfield Dual Land-Use 
Policy Challenge: Reducing Barriers to Private Redevelopment While Connecting Reuse to 
Broader Community Goals, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 287, 289 (2002) (noting that liability for 
contamination is “perhaps the greatest impediment to brownfield reuse” and also listing 
availability for funding, uncertain cleanup standards, and other regulatory requirements).  
116 Zeenat Kotval-K, Brownfield Redevelopment: Why Public Investments Can Pay Off, 
30 ECON. DEV. Q. 275, 276 (2016). 
117 Evans Paull, The Environmental and Economic Impacts of Brownfields 
Redevelopment 10 (NE-Midwest Inst., Working Draft for Distribution, July 2008) (citing 
other studies that also put the costs of remediation within that same range), 
http://www.nemw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2008-Environ-Econ-Impacts-Brown 
field-Redev.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCK8-BPZ4].  
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at the late stages of the redevelopment process.118 Even when the remediation and 
construction are complete, the mere fact that the land was formerly a brownfield 
may complicate the sale of property, as there tends to be a “general market 
resistance” with respect to these types of sites.119  
Moreover, financial institutions may be unwilling to provide financing for 
development projects on brownfields out of concern that the contamination will be 
more costly to remediate than anticipated, thereby reducing the site’s collateral 
value.120 In addition, taking title to a brownfield through foreclosure could make 
private lending institutions liable for cleanup costs.121 This potential exposure to 
liability further exacerbates lenders’ reticence to become involved in construction 
projects on contaminated sites. While this so-called “lender liability” was tempered 
by the 1996 amendments to CERCLA, it has not been completely eliminated.122 
 
(b)  The Unintended Effects of Regulation: How CERCLA’s Liability 
Provisions Jeopardized Brownfield Redevelopment 
 
Paradoxically, CERCLA liability has been the other factor significantly 
discouraging the redevelopment of brownfields.123 As noted earlier, this statute—
and its state equivalents—treat current owners of contaminated properties as 
potentially liable parties even if they demonstrably did not contribute to the 
contamination. Because developers often purchase the sites that they intend to 
                                               
118 Heather Campbell, Hugh Ellis & John Henneberry, Planning Obligations, Planning 
Practice, and Land-Use Outcomes, 27 ENVT. & PLAN. B: PLAN. & DESIGN 759, 770–71 
(2000). 
119 See Scott Sherman, Government Tax and Financial Incentives in Brownfields 
Redevelopment: Inside the Developer’s Pro Forma, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 317, 333 (2003).  
120 See McCarthy, supra note 115, at 291. 
121 For liability triggered by being a current owner or operator, see 42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a)(1) (2018). 
122 Section 101(20)(F)(ii) now provides that:  
 
The term “owner or operator” does not include a person that is a lender that did 
not participate in management of a vessel or facility prior to foreclosure, 
notwithstanding that the person—  
(I) forecloses on the vessel or facility; and  
(II) after foreclosure, sells, re-leases (in the case of a lease finance transaction), or 
liquidates the vessel or facility, maintains business activities, winds up operations, 
undertakes a response action [. . .] if the person seeks to sell, re-lease (in the case 
of a lease finance transaction), or otherwise divest the person of the vessel or 
facility at the earliest practicable, commercially reasonable time, on commercially 
reasonable terms, taking into account market conditions and legal and regulatory 
requirements.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(F)(ii).  
123 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 
2020] VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 817 
 
redevelop,124 developers can become automatically liable for all the contamination 
present on the property.125 As a result, CERCLA’s liability framework, in addition 
to being a powerful tool to strengthen agencies’ authority to require the cleanup of 
contaminated sites, also had the unintended effect of hindering the cleanup and 
redevelopment of brownfields.126  
One could question whether this effectively deters developers from targeting 
these types of properties. After all, if the developer is going to purchase the site to 
redevelop it, it will likely buy it at a discounted price to offset the cleanup costs.127 
Once the developer owns the site, it is likely to clean up the property prior to 
redeveloping it anyway, so being legally obligated to do so under this expansive 
liability approach should not, in principle, change the developer’s position. This 
argument, however, overlooks two important complications that result from the 
often-limited knowledge of the nature and extent of the contamination. First, a 
developer may find levels of contamination that exceed its predictions, to the point 
of making the development project inviable economically.128 Without landowner 
liability, the developer would simply be able to leave the lot vacant and, by doing 
so, cut its losses. Under CERCLA and state equivalent frameworks, however, the 
developer could be required to clean up the site anyway, which may dissuade the 
purchase of the brownfield in the first place.129  
Second, liability is not limited to the contamination present on the property that 
is being acquired. Developers could also be subject to the costs of cleaning up 
hazardous substances that originated at the purchased property but then migrated to 
                                               
124 Daniel B. Kohlhepp, The Real Estate Development Matrix 11 (Amer. Real Estate 
Soc’y Annual Meeting, Paper No. 299, 2012), https://www.ccimef.org/pdf/2012-299.The-
Real-Estate-Development-Matrix.4-21-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/UCK8-BPZ4].  
125 See supra Section I.A.2. 
126 See Jessica Higgins, Evaluating the Chicago Brownfields Initiative: The Effects of 
City-Initiated Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Communities, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. 
POL’Y. 240, 242–44 (2008).  
127 See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 277 (noting that developers tend to 
purchase brownfields at a lower cost). 
128 The construction of Inter Miami’s future soccer stadium in its projected location, for 
example, became unclear after additional contamination was found on the property. See Joey 
Flechas, Report on Beckham Stadium Site Shows Soil Contaminated by Unsafe Levels of 
Arsenic, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 8, 2019, 9:43 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
local/community/miami-dade/article234162647.html [https://perma.cc/4JCF-5WYY] 
(While team officials initially “estimated the cleanup would cost in the range of $35 million 
. . . officials have more recently estimated the cost could reach $50 million. The true number 
and its feasibility won’t be known until all parties consult with DERM to develop a cleanup 
plan.”). 
129 The enforcement risk may actually increase as a result of the transaction, given that 
some states require notice of the transfer of sites that may present a risk of contamination. 
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9(a) (West 2009); see also Revesz, supra note 83, at 605–
06 (explaining the disclosure obligations under New Jersey law when an industrial 
establishment is transferred).  
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other sites.130 For example, let us say that a developer buys Brownacre from 
Landowner and, while Landowner held title to the property, there was a release of 
hazardous substances that spread to a neighboring property, Greenacre. As the 
current owner of Brownacre, the developer could be held liable for the 
contamination of Greenacre. Thus, CERCLA-type liability can alter the developer’s 
original plans by requiring it to clean up more contamination than would have been 
strictly necessary to develop the site it purchased.  
To try to address these and other issues, CERCLA’s 1986 amendments 
incorporated a liability defense for certain owners who were justifiably unaware of 
the existence of contamination at the time they purchased the site—the so-called 
“innocent landowner defense.”131 This mechanism, however, has very important 
limitations that make it unsuitable to effectively address liability concerns in the 
context of brownfield redevelopment. Chief among these limitations is the 
requirement that the buyer “did not know and had no reason to know of” the 
contamination.132 As a result, the innocent landowner defense does not cover many 
of today’s real estate purchasers, who often knew of the site’s potential 
contamination and bought it with the intention of cleaning it up and then developing 
it.133 As explained in detail in Section II.A.1, CERCLA’s 2002 amendments created 
                                               
130 Section 107(a)(4) of CERCLA imposes liability, among others, on owners of the 
property “from which there is a release” but does not limit the extent of that liability to the 
contamination that is presently on that site. If the contamination originates at a site and later 
migrates, the owner of the property where the initial release of hazardous substances took 
place is responsible for the cleanup of properties contaminated by the released substances. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2018); Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corp., 272 F. 
Supp. 2d 1053, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding new owner liable for contamination that 
previous owner caused and that migrated to other sites); Jasmine M. Starr, Making Good 
Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 435, 450–51 (2004) (summarizing the facts and conclusions of the court in 
Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Whittaker Corporation).  
131 Luis Inaraja Vera, Compelled Costs Under CERCLA: Incompatible Remedies, Joint 
and Several Liability, and Tort Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 394, 399 (2016). This defense was 
carved into the preexisting “third party” defense. See Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A)(i), 9607(b)(3)). Many states have also 
adopted CERCLA’s third party and innocent landowner defenses by reference. See, e.g., 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25323.5(b) (West 2019) (effective May 26, 1999) (“For the 
purposes of this chapter, the defenses available to a responsible party or liable person shall 
be those defenses specified in Sections 101(35) and 107(b) of [CERCLA].” (citing 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601(35), 9607(b))); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(d)(5) (2019). 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i).  
133 This has been the object of criticism. One author in particular has referred to this 
defense as a “mirage.” L. Jager Smith, Jr., CERCLA’s Innocent Landowner Defense: Oasis 
or Mirage?, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 155, 157 (1993) (pointing out that “the innocent 
landowner defense provides effectively no reliable defense to a purchaser of real estate 
today” (emphasis in original)).  
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the “bona fide prospective purchaser” liability protection to tackle the limitations of 
the 1986 innocent landowner defense.134 The 2002 liability shield, however, only 
offers partial protection in states that have not incorporated an equivalent defense 




Part I has highlighted that, despite the increasing sophistication of 
environmental law over the past few decades, certain problems resist resolution—
for example, ensuring the cleanup and productive use of contaminated sites. The 
question becomes: what have regulators done to address these and other recalcitrant 
environmental issues? Part II answers this question by explaining the different 
mechanisms that the federal government and the states have adopted, as well as their 
limitations.  
 
II.  ADDRESSING THIRD-GENERATION ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS:  
THE EXPANSION OF VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS 
 
The existence of third-generation problems, such as those described in Part I, 
raises the question of whether third-generation solutions are an effective way of 
dealing with today’s enduring environmental problems.136 This more recent wave of 
regulatory tools has received a variety of names, including “new governance,” 
“collaborative governance,” “responsive regulation,” and “modular environmental 
regulation.”137 Two important common features of third generation approaches, 
however, are that they seek to achieve environmental goals in a flexible and efficient 
manner.138  
While third-generation government initiatives can adopt multiple forms, 
agencies have often chosen to create programs that rely on voluntary compliance by 
private actors. OSHA’s Voluntary Protection Programs, for example, removed 
certain facilities from its routine inspection list if they implemented a health and 
safety management system, agreed to improve workplace safety, and passed an 
                                               
134 See Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, §§ 221–222, 115 Stat. 2356, 2370–72 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 9601(40), 9607(r) (201802)).  
135 See infra Section II.A. 
136 Some scholars have answered this question in the affirmative. See Orly Lobel, The 
Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 343 (2004) (“[T]here is a growing consensus in legal 
scholarship that innovative approaches to law, lawmaking, and lawyering are possible and 
necessary.”). 
137 See Light, supra note 43, at 153. 
138 See Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 
DUKE L.J. 795, 798 (2005); Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The 
Dangerous Journey to Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 112 (1998).  
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initial inspection.139 EPA has also adopted voluntary programs, such as Performance 
Track and 3/50.140  
Another area in which voluntary programs have flourished is brownfield 
redevelopment. While the voluntary cleanup programs have generally received less 
attention from legal scholars, they are key to accelerating the cleanup of 
contaminated sites. As the two following subsections show, both the federal 
government and states have adopted multiple initiatives to deal with the brownfield 
problem. Although both levels of government have focused on the two main issues 
that hinder brownfield redevelopment—liability and economic concerns—states 
have been more innovative in their approach by creating a wide variety of voluntary 
programs.  
 
A.  Responses to Minimize the Unintended Effects of Regulation:  
Addressing New-Owner Liability 
 
As explained earlier, under CERCLA and other state statutes, the buyer of a 
brownfield can become liable for the contamination that is present on the property 
and also for pollution that has migrated to other sites.141 The practical effect of this 
is that the landowner can be subject to enforcement actions from the federal 
government and the state, as well as to cost recovery or contribution actions brought 
by the federal government, the state, and third parties.142 As noted above, this 
expansive liability framework has often discouraged developers from redeveloping 
brownfields.143 To address this problem, Congress and state legislatures have created 
legal protections that limit this type of liability in cases where the purchaser did not 
contribute to the contamination on the site or its migration to other properties. 
  
                                               
139 See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 15.  
140 See id. at 12–15; Steinzor, supra note 138, at 109. 
141 See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
142 The main liability provision in CERCLA, Section 107(a), states that liable parties 
are liable for costs incurred by the United States Government, a state, and “any other person.” 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2018). These entities can sue potentially responsible parties 
to recover costs they incur to carry out a removal or remedial action. Id. § 9613(g)(2). 
Lawsuits brought under this section are generally referred to as “cost-recovery” actions. 
Jeffrey M. Gaba, The Private Causes of Action Under CERCLA: Navigating the Intersection 
of Sections 107(a) and 113(f), 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 117, 117–20 (2015). Section 
113(f) of CERCLA allows other potentially responsible parties to bring a “contribution” 
action in certain cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). Moreover, the statute also contains a 
provision authorizing citizen suits. See id. § 9659. Lastly, Section 106 provides enforcement 
authority to the federal government in cases of “imminent and substantial endangerment to 
the public health or welfare or the environment.” Id. § 9606(a).  
143 See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
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1.  Federal Liability Protections: The Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser 
 
CERCLA’s innocent landowner defense, which was introduced in the 1986 
amendments, protected purchasers who did not know or had no reason to know that 
the property they acquired was contaminated.144 This left an important gap: there 
was no liability protection for innocent buyers of sites with known or even suspected 
contamination.145 Developers are often in exactly this position, so EPA responded 
by granting covenants-not-to-sue to purchasers of brownfields.146 These covenants 
protected landowners from enforcement and court actions initiated by EPA, but they 
were limited in that they did not prevent third-party claims—such as those filed by 
owners of neighboring properties.147  
In 2002, Congress amended CERCLA and created the bona fide prospective 
purchaser protection with the goal of dealing with the liability concerns under that 
the 1986 CERCLA amendments had left unaddressed.148 Since the enactment of the 
2002 amendments, buyers of contaminated sites are no longer liable to the federal 
government, the state, or third parties merely by becoming owners of the property, 
even if they had knowledge of the contamination.149  
Of course, to avail themselves of that favorable treatment, these purchasers 
must meet certain conditions aimed at ensuring that the buyer (i) took the necessary 
steps to learn about the existence and extent of the contamination and (ii) exercised 
                                               
144 See supra Section I.B.2.b. 
145 As some have pointed out, “this defense has been largely illusory since most courts 
have ruled that if the purchaser did not discover the contamination before the transaction, it 
probably did not conduct a sufficient inquiry.” See Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA 
Amendments Create New Defenses and Obligations for Owners of Contaminated Properties, 
PRAC. REAL EST. LAW., Sept. 2002, at 43–44.  
146 EPA tried to facilitate specific real estate transactions by providing prospective 
purchasers with covenants not to sue. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDANCE ON 
AGREEMENTS WITH PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS OF CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3–6 (May 24, 
1995), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/prosper-cont-mem.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49LF-BW39].  
147 Under these covenants, EPA agreed to not pursue an enforcement action. This, 
however, did not affect the remedies available to third parties under federal and state law.  
148 Small Business Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
118, § 222(a), 115 Stat. 2356, 2370 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) 
(2018)) (requiring that “[a]ll disposal of hazardous substances at the facility occurred before 
the person acquired the facility.”); see Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, LTD., 830 F.3d 
975, 982 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he ‘bona fide prospective purchaser defense,’ protect[s] facility 
owners from liability if they can prove, inter alia, that they did not acquire the facility until 
after the ‘disposal’ of hazardous substances at the facility.” (citations omitted)).  
149 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (“[A] bona fide prospective purchaser whose potential 
liability for a release or threatened release is based solely on the bona fide prospective 
purchaser being considered to be an owner or operator of a facility shall not be liable as long 
as the bona fide prospective purchaser does not impede the performance of a response action 
or natural resource restoration.”).  
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appropriate care to address the risk of further releases or migration of contaminants 
after acquiring the property.150 In other words, the 2002 amendments’ goal was to 
increase the incentives to buy, clean up, and redevelop brownfields, but without 
relaxing the liability of those who caused the contamination or allowed it to worsen. 
It is worth noting that, in practice, these conditions can make it very challenging 
for a buyer to acquire and maintain the bona fide prospective purchaser status. In 
PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, for example, it took the buyer of 
the property, Ashley, a year to implement the measures that would have helped 
prevent the spread of the contamination.151 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Ashley 
had not taken “appropriate care,” and that, as a result, it could not invoke the bona 
fide prospective purchaser protection against a claim brought by another potentially 
responsible party.152 
 
2.  Tenants, Renewable Energy on Brownfields, and CERCLA’s 2018 Amendments 
 
As explained above, it can be complicated for landowners to meet the 
requirements of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection, unless they are very 
diligent in addressing existing contamination. However, taking advantage of this 
protection was previously even more challenging for another category of potentially 
liable parties: tenants.153  
Under the version of CERCLA preceding the 2018 amendments, tenants could 
invoke the bona fide prospective purchaser status only if their landlord qualified for 
that legal protection as well.154 Thus, if the landowner was not a bona fide 
                                               
150 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(B)(i)–(viii) (requiring, among other duties, that the purchaser 
conduct appropriate inquiries with respect to the potential contamination, that it exercise 
appropriate care with respect to contaminants on the site, and that it comply with any existing 
institutional controls).  
151 714 F.3d 161, 181 (4th Cir. 2013). 
152 Id. 
153 Courts have often treated tenants as either owners and operators for liability 
purposes. See John Morris, What Tautology?: How the Whole Act Rule Could Inform 
CERCLA’s Ownership Definition and Limit Lessees’ Liability, 44 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 
271–72 (2014) (explaining that, after Bestfoods, courts have imposed so-called “lessee 
liability” when certain conditions about control of the facility have been met, and pointing 
out that “courts have come up with disparate answers to the question of whether. . . the rights 
possessed by a lessee are sufficient to rise to the level of ownership.”). 
154 The previous version of section 101(40) of CERCLA provided that “[t]he term ‘bona 
fide prospective purchaser’ means a person (or tenant of a person) that acquires ownership 
of a facility” and meets certain requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2012) (emphasis added). 
Therefore, if the landowner is not a person who qualifies for the liability protection, a tenant 
of that person will not qualify either. See David J. Freeman, Federal Budget Act Expands 
Lessees’ Ability to Claim Superfund Exemption as Bona Fide Prospective Purchasers, 
GIBBONS (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.rpelawalert.com/2018/04/06/federal-budget-act-
expands-lessees-ability-to-claim-superfund-exemption-as-bona-fide-prospective-purchasers 
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prospective purchaser, or if it later lost that status, the tenant would not be protected 
from liability either.155 While this problem affected tenants of contaminated 
properties broadly, EPA became concerned about this issue in the context of the 
development of renewable energy projects on contaminated sites.156 To address this 
gap, EPA issued a guidance document in 2012 indicating that it would use its 
enforcement discretion to “treat the tenant” as a bona fide prospective purchaser in 
instances where this protection would not have been available under the statute.157 
However, unlike a full legislative exemption from liability, the 2012 EPA guidance 
document did not protect the tenant from cost recovery or contribution claims 
brought by third parties.158 
The Consolidated Appropriations Act, which was signed into law in March of 
2018, provided further liability protections for tenants of contaminated sites.159 It 
modified the scope of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection under 
CERCLA to unequivocally include tenants among the parties who may qualify.160 
As with EPA’s 2012 guidance, one of the main drivers of the 2018 amendment was 
the need to expand the use of brownfields to host renewable energy production 
projects.161  
Two points should be made about the 2018 amendment. First, the expanded 
protection is likely to offer additional comfort to tenants of contaminated sites, given 
that EPA’s 2012 guidance document did not, strictly speaking, limit their CERCLA 
                                               
/#.Wvct1YWcGmR [https://perma.cc/CJD7-NTLH] (“Until now, lessees were precluded 
from qualifying as a BFPP unless the property owner was also a BFPP.”). 
155 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2012). 
156 Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Asst. Administrator, Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency & Mathy Stanislaus, Asst. Administrator, 
Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Regional 
Administrators, Regions I–X, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 1 (Dec. 5, 2012), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/tenants-bfpp-2012-mem-
note.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PSQ-HVM6]. 
157 See id. at 3–4. 
158 For a clarification of the difference between cost recovery and contribution suits, 
see supra note 142.  
159 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). 
Although less relevant for the purposes of this article, the amendment has also relaxed the 
standard that allows states and local governments to be exempt from liability when they 
acquire contaminated sites. See id. at Division N--BUILD Act, § 2, 132 Stat. at 1052 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20) (2018)).  
160 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)(ii)(I) (2018) (which includes, in the amended version 
of this section, those “who acquire[] a leasehold interest in the facility . . . .”).  
161 BUILD Act Alters CERCLA Liability Considerations and Funds Brownfield 
Redevelopment, THOMPSON REUTERS: PRAC. L. REAL EST., Apr. 2, 2018, at 2–3 (“The 
BUILD Act provides much needed funding for brownfield site redevelopment efforts. It also 
shifts liability considerations for owners and lessees of contaminated real property, and 
incentivizes further renewable energy development.”). 
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liability.162 Stated differently, EPA’s 2012 recognition of the bona fide prospective 
purchaser status for a tenant only offered protection against enforcement and cost 
recovery actions from that federal agency.163 The 2018 amendment, on the other 
hand, also protects tenants against cost recovery and contribution actions that states 
and third parties may bring under CERCLA.164  
The second point to note is that the 2018 amendment only protects against 
actions brought under CERCLA. As explained above, state statutes often provide an 
independent basis for enforcement and recovery of cleanup costs.165 As a result, 
unless states incorporate similar protections for tenants into their statutes, state 
agencies will still be able to hold tenants liable for the contamination to the same 
extent as before the 2018 amendment.166 
 
3.  State Liability Protections: Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
 
A common theme explored in Section II.A of this Article is that the federal 
bona fide prospective purchaser status only protects potentially responsible parties 
against actions that arise out of CERCLA, but being designated a bona fide 
prospective purchaser does not foreclose imposition of liability based on state 
statutes. Thus, these state statutes can also have the effect of discouraging 
brownfield redevelopment.167 
What have states done to prevent the liability provisions in their own statutes 
from compounding the brownfield problem? Most states have taken one of two 
courses of action. One common approach has been to create the equivalent of 
CERCLA’s bona fide prospective purchaser liability protection at the state level.168 
Many states and at least one city, however, have chosen instead to create voluntary 
                                               
162 As the document itself recognizes, the guidance merely “assist[ed] EPA personnel 
in exercising the Agency’s enforcement discretion [but did not] limit [] obligations under 
any federal, state, tribal, or local law.” Giles & Stanislaus, supra note 156, at 2. 
163 See id. 
164 See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)(ii)(I). 
165 See Mark McIntyre, How PlaNYC Will Facilitate Brownfield Redevelopment, 54 
N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 431, 435 n.17 (2010) (explaining that “[t]he [New York] Department 
of Environmental Conservation has broad authority to pursue parties that conduct inadequate 
cleanups.”).  
166 For an explanation of why CERCLA liability protections and defenses do not 
automatically limit state enforcement power, see supra Section I.A.3. 
167 See Pamela K. Elkow & Emilee Mooney Scott, It’s More Than Just AAI – 
“Continuing Obligations” and Other Ways to Limit Purchaser Liability, AM. BAR ASS’N 5 
(Oct. 22, 2014), https://studylib.net/doc/18665964/“continuing-obligations”-and-other-
ways-to-limit-purchaser [https://perma.cc/Q994-U85W].  
168 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.1-415(2) (West 2019).  
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cleanup programs (“VCPs”).169 VCPs, also known as “brownfields programs,”170 
aim to incentivize real estate developers to target brownfields, as these actors can be 
a driving force in cleaning up and putting these types of properties to productive 
use.171  
VCPs incorporate multiple features of third-generation environmental tools. 
First, VCPs are voluntary and rely on agreements entered into between agencies and 
owners or prospective purchasers of brownfields.172 Second, the private sector plays 
a central role in this process by leading and assuming the primary financial 
responsibility for the cleanup and redevelopment of the sites.173 Third, in order to 
obtain the involvement of the private sector, VCPs seek to provide a flexible and 
efficient avenue to perform the cleanups.174 
More specifically, the bargain typically goes as follows. The agency provides 
enrollees in the VCP—current owners or prospective purchasers of brownfields—
with one or multiple benefits, often in the form of economic incentives or more 
robust liability protections under state law.175 In exchange for these protections, 
                                               
169 See infra Section IV.A (describing New York City’s Voluntary Cleanup Program); 
Michael B. Gerrard, New York State’s Brownfields Programs: More and Less than Meets the 
Eye, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 18, 19–20 (1999) (providing an overview of New York’s 
initial Voluntary Remedial Program). 
170 As professor David Dana explains, these two terms have become practically 
interchangeable. David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of 
Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 86 n.2 (2005).  
171 Eisen, supra note 18, at 886–87. 
172 See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 7, at 12 (including voluntary programs in this 
newer wave of environmental tools); Freeman & Farber, supra note 138, at 909 (noting that 
agreement based decision-making is a key feature of modular environmental regulation).  
173 States also generally require developers to clean up the property that they purchased. 
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-310.32(a)(2) (2019) (requiring that “the brownfields 
property will be suitable for the uses specified in the agreement while fully protecting public 
health and the environment”); ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 335-15-4-.02(1)(d) (effective 2004) 
(“The limitation of liability provided by Code of Alabama 1975, §§ 22-30E-10 shall be 
contingent upon the applicant’s good faith implementation of the voluntary property 
assessment and/or voluntary cleanup plan as approved by the Department.”). Involvement of 
the private sector is also a feature of third-generation environmental initiatives. See Lobel, 
supra note 136, at 374. 
174 See Mark P. McIntyre, David J. Freeman, & Jesse Hiney, City Brownfields Program 
Aims to Accelerate Site Cleanup, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 22, 2010) (explaining that the New York 
City Voluntary Cleanup Program offers ample eligibility for contaminated properties and 
provides expedited approvals). Scholars have typically viewed flexibility and efficiency as 
key features of third-generation environmental tools. See Lazarus, supra note 4, at 92 (citing 
Steinzor, supra note 138, at 103). 
175 While some states allow current owners to enter into VCPs or brownfields programs, 
other states, such as Connecticut and Georgia, allow only a “prospective purchaser” to take 
advantage of the liability protections. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(a) (2019); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 12-8-203(b) (2019). Some have separate VCP and brownfield programs, one of 
which applies to current property owners while the other applies to prospective purchasers. 
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enrollees in the VCP must comply with a set of requirements. For example, in order 
to be eligible to join certain VCPs, purchasers must not have contributed to the 
contamination of the site—which could occur, for example, if a former operator of 
a property decided to buy it.176 Another frequent requisite is that developers must 
clean up the property that they purchased, even if during the process they discover 
higher levels of contamination than initially expected.177 If the developer still has to 
bear the risk of dealing with more extensive contamination than anticipated, what is, 
then, the utility of these liability protections? The answer is that, even if the 
developer must remediate the newly found contamination, liability relief provisions 
can still be very valuable because they will typically exempt VCP enrollees from 
off-site contamination (meaning hazardous substances that were released on the 
purchased property and subsequently migrated to other sites).178 
 
B.  Addressing the Economic Barriers to Brownfield Redevelopment 
 
Economic incentives try to address the other significant barrier to brownfield 
redevelopment: the additional costs associated with assessing and cleaning up the 
contamination, which can create a financing gap for developers.179 There are many 
economic incentives that have been adopted, the most common being low-interest 
                                               
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 9107 (2019) (covering VCPs in Delaware); id. §§ 9121–9126 
(covering brownfields). When analyzing liability protections, it is important to distinguish 
between the full liability protection that some states offer—which also has the effect of 
precluding legal actions by third parties—and the practice of providing covenants not to 
sue—which often limit enforcement by state agencies but not by third parties. Compare 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i)(1) (2019) (“An applicant whose application has been 
accepted into the brownfield remediation and revitalization program shall not be liable to the 
state or any person for the release of any regulated substance at or from the eligible 
property.” (emphasis added)), with TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-212-224(a)(6) (2019) (requiring 
the fulfilment of additional conditions in order for the liability protection to prevent third-
party contribution claims). 
176 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i) (2019) (limiting liability protection if the 
person enrolled in the program contributed to the contamination); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
147-F:4.I.(b) (2019) (including not having contributed to the contamination as an eligibility 
criteria to enroll in the program). 
177 See supra note 173. 
178 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 32-769(i) (2019) (exempting the participant in the 
program from liability “for the release of any regulated substance at or from the eligible 
property” (emphasis added)); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.1 (LexisNexis 2019) 
(protecting those who have received a certificate of completion from liability “arising out of 
the presence of any contamination in, on or emanating from the brownfield site that was the 
subject of such certificate.” (emphasis added)). 
179 Julianne Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield 
Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479, 480, 480 n.5 (2007) (citing CHARLES 
BARTSCH & BARBARA WELLS, NE-MIDWEST INST., FINANCING STRATEGIES FOR 
BROWNFIELD CLEANUP AND REDEVELOPMENT 1, 7 (2003)). 
 
2020] VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 827 
 
loans, grants, and tax benefits.180 When a state provides financial assistance, it 
typically does so in the context of a Voluntary Cleanup Program. The recipients of 
these economic incentives can also vary widely. The federal government generally 
awards grants and loans to states and municipalities, whereas states often offer 
economic assistance directly to developers.181 
 
1.  Overview of Federal Economic Incentives 
 
The federal government has regularly provided loans, grants, and tax benefits 
for brownfield redevelopment. For example, the Brownfields Expensing Tax 
Incentive, also referred to as the Section 198 cleanup deduction, allowed taxpayers 
to deduct the cost of cleanup expenses.182 The success of this tax incentive—which 
was created in 1997 and discontinued on December 31, 2011—has been called into 
question. As EPA stated in a 2011 report, the cleanup deduction was not frequently 
used.183 The report pointed to two main issues to explain the low popularity of the 
incentive: (i) the uncertainty over its availability (it lapsed five times and was then 
reauthorized for short periods of time);184 and (ii) the fact that it could be recaptured 
in some instances.185 Others have asserted that developers actually used the cleanup 
deduction more often than generally assumed, based on the high number of 
projects—630 in total—that were certified for the deduction across the United 
States.186  
Another brownfield redevelopment incentive program is the Small Business 
Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, signed into law in 2002, which 
introduced a variety of federal incentives for brownfield redevelopment 
                                               
180 Sherman, supra note 119, at 338–39. 
181 See infra Section IV.C.3.a. 
182 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL TAX INCENTIVES FOR 
BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT 2–3 (2011), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/20 
14-08/documents/tax_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/95LN-8P7Y] [hereinafter U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVES GUIDE]. 
183 Id. at 3. 
184 See id. In late April of 2018, a new bill was introduced in the House—H.R. 5579, 
the Brownfields Redevelopment Tax Incentive Reauthorization Act of 2018—which would 
reauthorize this expired tax incentive for the cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields. This 
bill, however, is in its early stages and may experience significant changes throughout the 
legislative process. See Steve Dwyer, Congress Tax Relief Proposal Good Harbinger for 
NYC Brownfields?, N.Y.C. BROWNFIELD PARTNERSHIP (June 12, 2018), https://nycbrownfie 
ldpartnership.org/nycbp-industry-news/7842611 [https://perma.cc/HQD6-XDQY]. 
185 See id. Recapture occurs when “an entity is required to add back a deduction or 
credit from a previous year to income.” Julia Kagan, Recapture, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 3, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/recapture.asp [https://perma.cc/V966-VTJS].  
186 REDEVELOPMENT ECON., THE FEDERAL BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVE: CASE 
STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF IMPACTS 2 (2015) (explaining that states “certified a total of 630 
sites in the 14-year history of the program.”). 
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administered by EPA.187 These include assessment grants, cleanup grants, job 
training grants, the revolving loan fund, and the Brownfields Area-Wide Planning 
program.188 The direct recipients of these incentives, however, are mostly state, 
local, tribal governments, and certain “quasi-governmental authorities,” rather than 
developers.189 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has also 
provided incentives specifically directed at brownfields, such as the Brownfields 
Economic Development Initiative awards.190 No funds, however, have been 
appropriated for this latter program since 2010.191 In addition to brownfield-specific 
incentives, there are other sources of funding—e.g., tax credits for real estate 
projects more broadly—that could potentially be used for redevelopment projects 
located on brownfields.192 
 
2.  Recent Changes in Federal Funding for Brownfield Cleanup and 
Redevelopment 
 
The two most significant changes in federal funding for brownfield 
redevelopment are found in the Consolidated Omnibus Appropriations Act of 
                                               
187 See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601, 9604, 9605, 
9607, 9622, 9628).  
188 JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY’S BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM: SCOPE, AUTHORITIES, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 3–4 (2008); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(k), 9628(a) (2018). 
189 Id. at 3.  
190 Brownfields Economic Development Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. 
EXCH., https://www.hudexchange.info/programs/bedi/ [https://perma.cc/3M4J-MMTQ] 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Brownfields Economic Development Initiative].  
191 See id.  
192 For example, the historic rehabilitation tax credit and the low-income housing tax 
credit could be used to redevelop certain brownfield sites. See Charlie Bartsch, New Tax Law 
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2018,193 also referred to as the “Omnibus Act,”194 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 
2017,195 commonly known as the Trump Administration’s “New Tax Law.”196 
The main goal of the provisions of the Omnibus Act of 2018 pertaining to 
brownfields is to inject flexibility into the existing grant programs. For example, 
under the Omnibus Act, sites that are only contaminated with petroleum are now 
eligible for certain types of funding even if they do not meet the conditions that the 
previous version of the statute required, including now allowing funding for sites 
that present more than a “low risk.”197 The Act also now allows grants that cover 
characterization, assessment, and remediation, whereas the previous statute required 
that separate grants be awarded for characterization/assessment and remediation.198 
In addition to greater flexibility, the amendments also increased the maximum 
amounts of remediation grants from $200,000 to $500,000, with the possibility of 
reaching $650,000 with EPA’s approval.199 It is important to note, however, that the 
total authorization for appropriations will remain at the same level as in the previous 
version of the statute, i.e., $200,000.200 
The New Tax Law was signed into law on December 22, 2017.201 One of the 
main innovations was the creation of tax benefits for projects in opportunity zones. 
While this incentive is not specific to brownfields, many of the opportunity zones—
low-income census tracts that are designated in accordance with the statutory 
                                               
193 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). 
194 Michael J. Quinn, United States: The BUILD Act: Revisions to Environmental Due 




195 Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).  
196 See, e.g., Darla Mercado, Trump Wants to Extend His Tax Overhaul. What It Means 
for You, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2020, 4;09 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/10/trump-wants-
to-extend-his-tax-overhaul-what-it-means-for-you.html [https://perma.cc/CZT9-MHMN]. 
197 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II)(bb)(AA) (2002) (requiring that petroleum-
only sites be “relatively low risk”), with 42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(D)(ii)(II)(bb) (2018) (no 
longer including such a requirement).  
198 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Division N—BUILD Act § 9(3), 132 
Stat. at 1056 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 9604(k)(4) (2018) (creating the multipurpose 
brownfield grants)); David J. Freeman, Budget Act Makes Changes to Federal Brownfield 
Program, GIBBONS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.rpelawalert.com/2018/04/10/budget-act-
makes-changes-to-federal-brownfield-program/#.Wv8peIWcGmR [https://perma.cc/N8G6-
KBUT].  
199 See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Division N—BUILD Act § 8, 132 Stat. 
at 1055. 
200 See id. § 13, 132 Stat. at 1058.  
201 Budget Fiscal Year, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. 
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procedure202—have a high concentration of contaminated sites.203 The incentives for 
investors include the possibility to defer tax on prior capital gains invested in 
opportunity zones and other mechanisms that could have favorable tax treatment 
when the investment is sold after ten or more years.204 Moreover, the Omnibus Act 
has not eliminated the existing tax incentives that could potentially be used for 
brownfields, such as the historic rehabilitation tax credits, the new markets tax 
credits, the low-income housing tax credits, etc.205 It is worth noting, however, that 
some of these incentives may become less valuable given the general reduction in 
the corporate tax rate.206 
 
3.  State-Level Economic Incentives Linked to VCPs 
 
Federal incentives have helped redevelopment efforts in numerous 
contaminated sites.207 However, federal programs can only address a very limited 
number of brownfields in any given state every year. As a brownfield redevelopment 
expert put it, federal funding for these types of sites has only been “a drop in the 
bucket.”208 
To fill the funding gap, many states have created their own economic incentives 
for brownfield redevelopment, which they often provide to enrollees in their 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs.209 The State of Colorado, for example, provides “a 
40% tax credit on cleanup expenses up to $750,000 and a 30% credit on cleanup 
                                               
202 The designation procedures include a nomination by the state and certification by 
the Secretary of the Treasury. See id. § 13823, 131 Stat. at 2183 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(b)).  
203 Webinar: Opportunity Zones - Spurring Brownfields Revitalization with the New 
Tax Law, CTR. FOR CREATIVE LAND RECYCLING, https://www.cclr.org/civicrm/event/info? 
reset=1&id=246 [https://perma.cc/W55R-VV2P] (last visited May 18, 2018) (implying the 
overlap between opportunity zones and corridors of contaminated properties).  
204 See Budget Fiscal Year, 2018 § 13823, 131 Stat. at 2183 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 1400Z-2(b), (c)). 
205 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
206 See Bartsch, supra note 192. 
207 See, e.g., REDEVELOPMENT ECON., supra note 186, at 6–7 (listing a number of 
projects that benefited from the Brownfields Expensing Tax Incentive). 
208 Sylvia Carignan, Trump Proposes New Funding Options for Superfund, Brownfields 
(1), BLOOMBERG ENV’T, https://www.bna.com/trump-proposes-new-n57982088681/ 
[https://perma.cc/4LBP-FRDT] (last updated Feb. 12, 2018, 4:27 PM) (quoting Dan French, 
chief executive officer of Brownfield Listings). 
209 It is important to note, however, that some of these state incentives are funded 
through the federal programs mentioned above. See, e.g., WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., PUB. NO. 
RR-753, WISCONSIN READY FOR REUSE PROGRAM: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE LOANS & 
GRANTS, https://dnr.wi.gov/files/PDF/pubs/rr/RR753.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2ST-TT2Z] 
(“The D[epartment of ]N[atural ]R[esources] receives funding for this program through U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Revolving Loan Fund grants.”).  
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expenses greater than $750,000 up to $1,500,000.”210 Other states, including 
Massachusetts, New York, and Delaware, offer brownfield-specific tax credits to 
developers.211 Wisconsin awards grants for cleanup activities of up to $200,000.212 
Ohio provides “property assessment services at no cost to eligible applicants,” which 
must be local governments or quasi-government entities.213 Indiana makes low-and-





Part II has examined how agencies are using third-generation tools—and 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs in particular—to deal with complicated environmental 
issues. This raises three important questions: (i) are these tools effective?, (ii) how 
can policymakers improve them?, and (iii) which level of government is in the best 
position to lead these efforts? The remainder of this Article aims to advance the 
conversation on these three questions. 
 
III.  ASSESSING THE PERFORMANCE OF THIRD-GENERATION  
ENVIRONMENTAL TOOLS 
 
As regulatory instruments become increasingly complex, so does the task of 
evaluating their performance. Sophisticated government programs, such as third-
generation voluntary tools, often have many moving parts and are intertwined with 
initiatives led by other agencies.215 Nevertheless, as is true of any other government 
action involving public expenditures, measuring their success is critical to ensuring 
that agencies use their limited economic resources wisely. 
Unfortunately, there are a number of factors that complicate this task. First, 
third generation voluntary programs tend to have multiple goals—VCPs, for 
example, aim to promote fast cleanups, address environmental justice issues, ensure 
compliance with health standards, etc.216 Second, measuring if the agency is 
                                               
210 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE 
PROGRAMS 51 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/state 
_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5RE2-CSUG]. 
211 See id. at 7, 13, 16.  
212 See WIS. DEP’T NAT. RES., supra note 209. 
213 Grant-Funded Brownfield Assistance, OHIO ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://epa.ohio.gov/derr/SABR/Grant_Assistance.aspx [https://perma.cc/BH6L-TQUJ] (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2019).  
214 Financial Assistance, IND. FIN. AUTH., https://www.in.gov/ifa/brownfields/2366.ht 
m#taxincentives [https://perma.cc/Q4SW-GUBY] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).  
215 See infra Section IV.C.3 (analyzing the challenges of isolating the effects of a local 
program when state and federal initiatives are also involved).  
216 See infra Section III.A. 
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successfully achieving each goal requires the use of different methodological 
approaches. These two obstacles are typically connected: the literature often fails to 
assess goals that, despite their importance, are more complicated to measure.217 The 
next two sections delve into the practical aspects of this problem by exploring the 
challenges of measuring the success of VCPs. 
 
A.  Determining an Adequate Measure of Success for VCPs 
 
Scholars and policymakers have a variety of strategies at their disposal to assess 
the performance of VCPs. For example, one could focus on the number of sites that 
have enrolled in the program and conclude that a high figure is reflective of 
success.218 Other options include determining the number of sites that have been 
cleaned up since the inception of the program,219 average duration of the cleanup 
process, or the cleanup standards reached for the sites enrolled in the VCP.220 Some 
scholars have even analyzed the distributional impacts of these types of programs 
and the variations in property values that they may have triggered.221  
All this information can be useful. For example, given its voluntary nature, high 
enrollment in a VCP may signal that participants are finding the program to be 
advantageous. Moreover, quick cleanups may indicate that the program is run in an 
efficient manner. However, these approaches neglect to evaluate one of the most 
critical features of a VCP: whether the program is actually spurring brownfield 
redevelopment.222 Stated differently, the question is whether a VCP is actually 
incentivizing public and private parties to acquire, clean up, and redevelop 
brownfields that would otherwise remain vacant or underused; as opposed to merely 
increasing the benefit for those who, as a result of the market forces, were going to 
purchase these sites anyway.  
There are other ways of framing the success of VCPs that can also lead to an 
overestimation of their benefits. When the parcels remediated under a VCP have 
been put to commercial uses, agencies sometimes argue that the program has been 
successful by pointing to job creation or private investment figures associated with 
                                               
217 See infra Section III.B. 
218 See, e.g., U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY 
RESPONSE PROGRAMS (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/docume 
nts/state_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y46G-4CHV] (noting the number of sites enrolled in each state VCP).  
219 See id. (including the number of remediated sites under each state VCP). 
220 See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 11–12. 
221 See, e.g., Hunter Bacot & Cindy O’Dell, Establishing Indicators to Evaluate 
Brownfield Redevelopment, 20.2 ECON. DEV. Q. 142, 154 (2006); McCarthy, supra note 115, 
at 293–94. 
222 See Sherman, supra note 119, at 368 (“[F]rom a policy viewpoint, the core question 
is whether the incentive really would spur development at a site that otherwise would not be 
feasible and thus would be ignored by the private sector.”).  
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the activities that are carried out at the site after the cleanup is complete.223 These 
types of statements contain an implied assumption about VCPs, which is that 
redevelopment of brownfields would not occur but for these programs and that, 
consequently, the positive effects observed can be directly attributed to the 
programs.224 Interestingly, this assumption is seldom proven when government 
agencies or scholars make statements about how a certain VCP created X number of 
jobs or attracted Y millions of dollars in investment.225 
But, is this premise accurate or even reasonable? The scholarship on this 
question is extremely scarce. However, there are some basic principles that can 
provide some insight as to whether the claim that a given VCP is actually 
incentivizing brownfield redevelopment is justified. The following table captures 




Cleanup Cost Economic 
Incentive Provided 
Scenario A (VCP more 
likely to spur development) 
Low High High 
Scenario B (VCP’s ability 
to spur development is 
uncertain) 
High Low Low 
 
The premise that a significant proportion of the sites that enroll in a VCP would 
not be redeveloped but for the existence of the program may be accurate in some 
instances. In scenario A, for instance, the return on investment in brownfields may 
be low or even negative as a result of the land value, high cleanup costs, and the 
conditions of the real estate market in the area, but the economic incentives provided 
by the program are high. When a scenario like this occurs, a very undesirable 
property is being matched with a very generous incentive, and it is certainly likely 
that the property would not have been redeveloped without the incentive.226 
However, the but-for assumption does not necessarily hold true in the reverse 
scenario, scenario B, when the value of the land is relatively high despite the 
contamination, and the financial assistance for brownfield redevelopment is modest. 
In this context, the need for the incentive is much lower, so it is not reasonable to 
simply assume that the VCP is changing developers’ behavior without proof.227 
                                               
223 See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 279. 
224 This assumption is implicit in statements suggesting that, by creating a VCP, “the 
state receives the increased tax revenue from the redevelopment, improved environmental 
quality for its citizens, and conserves state enforcement resources.” Fortney, supra note 13, 
at 1873. 
225 See Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 279. 
226 See Sherman, supra note 119, at 368 (explaining that a sizeable grant has the ability 
to “enhance project feasibility”). 
227 As noted in the literature, even different developers can respond differently to the 
same subsidy and liability protection package, injecting additional complexity to this issue. 
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B.  The Challenges of Measuring Whether a VCP Is Incentivizing Brownfield 
Redevelopment 
 
Determining if a VCP is incentivizing brownfield redevelopment is an arduous 
task because agencies rarely have sufficient data to do so. As explained above, it is 
relatively easy to gain access to information on the number of sites enrolled in a 
VCP. High enrollment in a VCP is indicative of success in a very narrow sense. 
Robust enrollment confirms that, when given the opportunity to take advantage of 
this type of program, redeveloping a site under the VCP is more attractive than doing 
so without government intervention. This is a significant accomplishment. VCPs 
require the approval of certain documents by the supervising agency,228 which will 
inevitably delay the investigation and cleanup process. The fact that a developer is 
willing to take on this burden voluntarily strongly suggests that the incentives that 
the program offers outweigh the delay and other inconvenience that dealing with the 
agency may entail.229 From a public health standpoint, increasing the number of 
supervised cleanups is also a laudable goal, as this is likely to result in greater 
compliance with the applicable remediation standards and best practices.230  
However, as noted above, enrollment figures alone cannot support the 
conclusion that the program has been successful in spurring brownfield 
redevelopment.231 Without more information, one cannot rule out other possible 
explanations for high enrollment in the program. For example, the plausible 
possibility that most of the observed redevelopment would have also occurred 
without the VCP—which is likely to be true in areas where real estate markets are 
thriving. There are, of course, intermediate options. Thus, the VCP may have 
increased the redevelopment of brownfields by 20%, 50%, or any other percentage.  
How, then, should we evaluate if a VCP is spurring brownfield redevelopment? 
Another option could be to rely on vacancy periods—the number of years during 
which a property was vacant before joining the program. If we are examining the 
                                               
Anna Alberini et al., The Role of Liability, Regulation and Economic Incentives in 
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment: Evidence from Surveys of Developers, 35 
REG’L SCI. & URB. ECON. 327, 349 (2005). 
228 Bacot & O’Dell, supra note 221, at 148. 
229 It is important to note, however, that in some cases the option of conducting an 
unsupervised cleanup may not exist, if the property has been flagged by the federal, state, or 
local governments as being potentially contaminated. This could occur, for example, if a 
previous owner reported a spill of hazardous substances in the past. 
230 EPA Principles for Greener Cleanups, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https:/www.epa.gov/greenercleanups/epa-principles-greener-cleanups [https://perma.cc/BV 
W7-LAEZ] (last updated Sept. 5, 2018). 
231 Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, for example, conclude that data indicating that a program 
has been widely used “is evidence that, at a minimum, the [program] has created a viable 
market in [brownfields].” Hula & Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 280 (emphasis 
added). However, this market could have existed before the programs were put into place. 
See id. 
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success of a new program, long vacancy periods followed by enrollment in the VCP 
would seem to suggest that the program is triggering the redevelopment of sites that 
would otherwise still be vacant. However, the vacancy period approach presents 
serious limitations. First, it focuses on a particular type of brownfield: those that are 
vacant. The vacancy period approach does not consider sites that, while not being 
vacant, are underutilized because of the contamination. As explained above in 
Section I.B.1, these properties also fall within the scope of EPA’s definition of 
brownfield.232 Second, there are many reasons, other than the effect of the program, 
that could explain why properties that had been vacant for several years are now 
being redeveloped. For example, the real estate market could be rebounding after a 
recession. This could spur the development of properties that were not attractive to 
developers a few years earlier.233 A similar phenomenon could occur as a result of a 
rezoning process. If a certain area is up-zoned—meaning that higher-value or denser 
uses will now be permitted—sites that had been vacant for a long time could 
suddenly become more appealing to developers.234 In short, as with enrollment 
numbers, an analysis of vacancy periods alone does not provide enough information 
to evaluate whether a VCP is incentivizing brownfield redevelopment.  
An alternative strategy would be to determine whether there has been a 
noticeable change in brownfield redevelopment in a particular jurisdiction since the 
agency launched the program. While this methodology can lead to sound 
conclusions, it presents a number of practical challenges. First, to make such a 
comparison, it is necessary to have an inventory of the existing brownfields in the 
jurisdiction, or a significant portion thereof. VCP enrollment data is insufficient 
because it provides information on which properties are, or have been, in the 
programs but does not indicate which brownfields have been redeveloped outside of 
a program or the number of brownfields that were being redeveloped before the 
program was created.235 Having data on the redevelopment of brownfields before 
the inception of the program is necessary to establish a baseline to determine whether 
there was a significant increase in the redevelopment rates for brownfields after the 
launch of a program. 
Second, determining if a particular VCP is spurring brownfield redevelopment 
can be challenging due to the existence of multiple layers of incentives and 
regulations—federal, state, and local—that could mask or enhance the perceived 
                                               
232 See supra Section I.B.1. 
233 Joseph Nguyen, 4 Key Factors that Drive the Real Estate Market, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/mortages-real-estate/11/factors-affecting-real-estate-
market.asp [https://perma.cc/4MA7-JLUY] (last updated June 25, 2019).  
234 See Up-zoning, THE WORLD BANK, https://urban-regeneration.worldbank.org/node 
/21 [https://perma.cc/DY7B-458T] (last visited, Aug. 19, 2019). 
235 As noted in the literature, “[o]ne key difficulty in adequately evaluating brownfield 
programs is the lack of capacity to track the existence and redevelopment of sites.” Hula & 
Bromley-Trujillo, supra note 115, at 277. Others have also noted the difficulties of 
establishing a baseline for comparison. See Alberini & Segerson, supra note 17, at 160. 
 
836 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
effects of the program that is being evaluated.236 Thus, it is important to have a clear 
understanding of the most significant incentives—in addition to those offered by the 
VCP that is being evaluated—that could have affected brownfield redevelopment in 
a certain geographic area during a given period. Part IV takes on this challenge by 
proposing a methodology to address these and other practical challenges. 
 
IV.  ASSESSING THE SUCCESS OF THE FIRST LOCAL VCP 
 
In 2010, New York City created the first municipally run brownfield cleanup 
program.237 The City’s VCP has two features that make it a particularly interesting 
case study. First, developers have used the program widely even though it has only 
been in place for ten years. Second, and most important, this VCP is a particularly 
good example of a program whose ability to drive development, if not tested, would 
be uncertain. This uncertainty results from a combination of factors: the program 
targets mildly contaminated sites (which tend to have lower cleanup costs), it 
operates in a geographic area with high property values, and it provides relatively 
low economic incentives. As explained above, this is the type of context—scenario-
B-type cases—in which it is a priori unclear whether the VCP would have an impact 
on the redevelopment rate of brownfields.238 
 
A.  NYC’s Voluntary Cleanup Program 
 
The City’s decision to create a cleanup program was, in part, in response to 
changes in 2005 to the administration of the New York State Brownfield Cleanup 
Program (“state program”) that had the effect of making a large number of 
brownfields in New York City ineligible to enroll in the state program.239 The City 
programs sought to provide an alternative for these New York City sites, while also 
bringing new businesses and jobs, and new affordable housing and open space.240  
The primary City program is the NYC Voluntary Cleanup Program (“NYC 
VCP”), which monitors the investigation, cleanup, and site management activities 
                                               
236 See supra Part II (explaining the variety of state- and federal-level incentives for 
brownfield redevelopment). 
237 About OER, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oer/ 
about/directors-message.page [https://perma.cc/3Y3K-UPHN] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).  
238 See supra Section III.A. 
239 See McIntyre et al., supra note 174.  
240 THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PLANYC: PROGRESS REPORT 2014, at 11 (2014), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/downloads/pdf/140422_PlaNYCP-Report_FINAL_ 
Web.pdf, [https://perma.cc/UE4E-ZVMJ] (tracking the increase in jobs and housing 
correlated to city goals) [hereinafter PLANYC]; N.Y.C. OFFICE OF ENVTL. REMEDIATION, 
N.Y.C. VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM, http://www.nyc.gov/html/oer/html/voluntary-
cleanup-program/vcp.shtml [https://perma.cc/YCE5-YYEX] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).  
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at enrolled brownfields.241 Landowners interested in enrolling a property in the NYC 
VCP may file an application to the agency administering the program. Any real 
property within New York City with light to moderate levels of contamination is 
eligible to enroll in the NYC VCP, with limited exceptions, such as sites enrolled in 
the state cleanup program.242  
The NYC VCP offers multiple incentives to its participants, including a 
covenant not to sue,243 a formal recognition that properties remediated under the 
program have achieved all applicable government cleanup standards in New York 
State,244 and grants for investigation and cleanup.245 The grant program is an 
important part of this framework. It has the stated goal of “promot[ing] the cleanup 
and redevelopment of brownfield properties in the city of New York.”246 The grant 
amounts, however, are rather modest. Although the maximum grant that a project 
may receive varies depending on the type of project—and, in some instances, the 
type of developer—the following figures are illustrative of the order of magnitude 
of these economic incentives. The standard grant has two caps, the highest being 
$35,000.247 The maximum amount that a project may claim—if it meets the criteria 
to be considered a “city-supported development”248—was initially set at $100,000 
                                               
241 Site management activities have the goal of minimizing exposure to the 
contaminants that remain at the site after cleanup. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1402.eee (2020).  
242 Sites with light to moderate levels of contamination include those with “detectable 
levels of contamination, the presence of which does not require an applicant or enrollee to 
conduct any mandatory, governmental-supervised investigation or remediation of the 
contamination under any state or federal law.” N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-902 (2019). Other 
exceptions include sites that contain petroleum, listed in certain state and federal registries, 
or subject to enforcement actions. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1403 (2020); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 24-902 (2019). 
243 See infra Section V.B.  
244 See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1429(b) (2020) (defining “green property certification”). 
245 See id. § 43-1415 to -1423.  
246 Id. § 43-1415(a). 
247 See id. § 43-1422.c.1, Schedule A. The amount can reach $50,000 if the applicant is 
a not-for-profit developer or a developer of a residential building where all units are 
affordable. See id. § 43-1422.c.2. 
248 City-supported development properties are those:  
 
[A]t publicly-owned sites, at affordable and/or supportive housing sites funded by 
the New York city department of housing preservation and development, at 
industrial or manufacturing development sites supported by the New York city 
economic development corporation or other projects receiving substantial support 
from the City, and at environmental tax lien sites designated by the New York 
city office of management and budget.  
 
14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1417(a), (b) (2019). 
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and was raised to $250,000 in 2016.249 These amounts are an order of magnitude 
lower than the average tax credit granted under the state program, which the New 
York State Comptroller’s Office estimated at $9.4 million per project in 2013.250 
 
B.  Traditional Methods of Assessing VCPs: Enrollment 
 
As discussed in Part III, knowing how many sites have enrolled in a VCP, while 
not being a particularly compelling method of measuring overall success, can still 
provide valuable insights on important aspects of the program. The agency running 
the NYC VCP, the NYC Mayor’s Office of Environmental Remediation (“OER”), 
has reported basic figures on the program. For example, based on OER’s estimates, 
the developments performed under the NYC VCP have yielded over 9,000 units of 
affordable and supportive housing and created more than 13,000 permanent jobs.251  
Obtaining more detailed data on the sites enrolled in the NYC VCP, however, 
has required the collection of thousands of technical documents. These datasets were 
built based on the data available on OER’s two websites.252 The number of 
applications in 2010 through 2017 was in excess of 560, and over 500 sites 
ultimately enrolled in the NYC VCP.253 These figures, when compared to other state 
cleanup programs, show the NYC VCP has been very broadly used. To provide some 
perspective, it is illustrative to examine application and enrollment data from state 
programs that share similar features with the NYC VCP.254 The New York State 
program was created in 2003, and as of January of 2017, the agency administering 
it had approved 713 applications since the program’s inception.255 VCPs in Illinois 
                                               
249 With the caveat that, if the project is enrolled in the NYC VCP, the site is also 
eligible for a $50,000 cleanup grant. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1422.c.12 (2019). 
250 THOMAS P. DINAPOLI, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER, BROWNFIELD RESTORATION IN 
NEW YORK STATE: PROGRAM REVIEW AND OPTIONS 15 (April 2013), https://nysl.ptfs.com/ 
awweb/pdfopener?sid=A5C1E2DEE71D433813D51F1004C7B1BD&did=114817&fl=%2
FLibrary1%2Fpdf%2F852898120.pdf [https://perma.cc/RV8K-M2SA].  
251 PLANYC, supra note 240, at 11 (reporting 3,900 new affordable housing units and 
6,400 jobs created from 2011 to 2014 as a result of the VCP program); THE CITY OF NEW 
YORK, PROGRESS REPORT: ONENYC 2018, at 71 (2018), https://onenyc.cityofnewyork.us/ 
wp-content/uploads/2018/04/OneNYC_Progress_2018-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9X5H-
LEDY] (reporting an increase of 5,200 units and 7,000 jobs from 2014 to 2018 as a result of 
the VCP program).  
252 Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, 
https:/www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8442.html [https://perma.cc/HYA7-2MET] (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2020).  
253 INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 6.  
254 The New York State, Illinois, and Ohio VCPs are similar to the NYC VCP in that 
they are voluntary, they provide economic incentives, and they include assurances that those 
who remediate sites under the program will either enjoy liability protections or a lower 
likelihood of enforcement.  
255 See U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, STATE BROWNFIELDS AND VOLUNTARY RESPONSE 
PROGRAMS 13 (2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-12/documents/state 
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and Ohio were launched in the 1990s but had enrolled 799 and 655, respectively, as 
of January 1, 2017.256  
The duration of the cleanup can also shed some light on whether a particular 
program is being administered efficiently. How swiftly the process moves forward 
is generally related not only to the duration of the cleanup activities but also to the 
amount of time that the agency supervising the remediation takes to grant the 
approval of the different documents that the developer is required to generate at the 
various stages of the process. As explained in detail elsewhere, it takes an NYC VCP 
enrollee approximately 21 months on average to complete the cleanup, compared to 
almost 58 months under the state program.257 To make a fair comparison, however, 
it is important to note that sites in the state program tend to be more contaminated 
than NYC VCP sites, and therefore may require more extensive remediation.258 
 
C.  Has the NYC VCP Spurred Redevelopment? 
 
The metrics examined above, while impressive and useful, do not address a key 
question that many VCPs raise: Is the program, in addition to recruiting enough 
enrollees, driving the redevelopment of contaminated sites? One of the main goals 
of VCPs generally is to promote the redevelopment of brownfields that, in the 
absence of these programs, would be left vacant or underused.259 As the City has 
made clear on multiple occasions, the NYC VCP is no exception.260 This Section 
addresses this question by examining if the redevelopment rate of brownfields in 
                                               
_brownfields_voluntary_response_program_report_508_11-2017_web.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/5RE2-CSUG]. 
256 See id. at 32, 36; Site Remediation Program Database Search, ILL. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.illinois.gov/topics/cleanup-programs/bol-database/srp/index 
[https://perma.cc/ZET2-9QGQ] (last visited Jan. 13, 2020). 
257 INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 12. 
258 Id. at 11. 
259 See Sherman, supra note 119, at 317 (“Recognizing the need to secure the cleanup 
of historic contamination and spur the redevelopment of underutilized sites, government 
policy-makers have sought to reform the regulatory framework under which brownfield 
issues are addressed.”). 
260 See, e.g., About: Director’s Message, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION, 
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/oer/about/directors-message.page [https://perma.cc/3Y3K-
UPHN] (last visited, Aug. 19, 2019) (“The New York City Mayor’s Office of Environmental 
Remediation (OER) is a team of scientists and engineers that design and operate programs 
to promote the cleanup and redevelopment of vacant contaminated land in NYC.”); Stu 
Loeser & John Gallagher, Mayor Bloomberg Presents PlaNYC:, A Greener, Greater New 
York, CITY OF N.Y. (Apr. 22, 2007), https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/119-
07/mayor-bloomberg-presents-planyc-a-greener-greater-new-york#/0 [https://perma.cc/56 
39-R5ZJ] (“We propose to speed the clean-up of all 7,600 acres of brownfields still in our 
city – while also ensuring public health protections by developing new time-saving 
strategies, new city-specific remediation guidelines, and a new city brownfields office to 
oversee the initiatives and encourage community involvement.”). 
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New York City has increased since the creation of the program in 2010. This 
required dealing with three major issues: distinguishing brownfields from non-
brownfields; defining an adequate measure of redevelopment rates; and minimizing 
the effects of other programs so as to adequately measure the impact of the NYC 
VCP on brownfield redevelopment rates. 
 
1.  Defining the Treatment and Control Groups: Which Lots Should Be Considered 
Brownfields? 
 
Brownfields are usually defined very broadly as properties that are either 
contaminated or present a risk of contamination.261 While there is no official list of 
brownfields in New York City, the City does maintain two lists of tax lots with 
potential environmental issues. The agency adds tax lots to these lists when they 
receive an E-designation or an environmental restrictive declaration (“ERD”) in the 
context of the City’s environmental review process,262 which typically takes place 
when one or more lots are rezoned.263 The compilation of these lists started in the 
1980s, but the vast majority of E-designations and ERDs have been added after 
1999.264 The purpose of the two lists is to ensure that developers address the 
environmental issues in listed lots before they reuse or redevelop them. To achieve 
this goal, City regulations require that OER, the agency running the NYC VCP, grant 
its approval before the Department of Buildings may grant a building permit for a 
lot that has an E-designation or ERD.265  
There are three types of E-designations and ERDs: hazardous materials, noise, 
and air quality.266 Lots with hazardous materials E-designations or ERDs are good 
                                               
261 Overview of EPA’s Brownfields Program: EPA’s Brownfields and Land 
Revitalization Program Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/brown 
fields/overview-epas-brownfields-program [https://perma.cc/94N2-3TJC] (last visited Jan. 
13, 2020).  
262 These two categories have, for the most part, merged into one. See INARAJA VERA, 
N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 3 n.8 (“The rules before the 2012 amendment did 
not allow the city to place an E-designation on a lot if the applicant (of the rezoning) was 
also the owner. In these cases, the environmental requirements were incorporated into an 
environmental restrictive declaration. The 2012 amendment expanded the scope of the E-
designation provisions to include lots owned by the applicant.”). 
263 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 11-15 (2012); 15 R.C.N.Y. § 24-04 (2019). In some 
instances, lots may also receive an E-designation or ERD as a result of zoning actions that 
do not involve a formal rezoning (e.g., special permits or variances). Id. § 24-04.b; see id. § 
24-03 (defining “Zoning Action”). 
264 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION app. C, tbl.1 and tbl.2. 
265 See id. § 24-08(a) (notice of satisfaction). Other options are a notice of no objection 
and a notice to proceed.  
266 Hazardous materials E-designations currently include the former “underground 
gasoline storage tank” E-designation. The term “hazardous materials” in this article will be 
used to encompass both “hazardous materials” and “underground gasoline storage tank” E-
designations. 
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proxies for brownfields. As reflected in the definition of brownfield discussed in 
Part I, it is the potential, not actual, presence of contamination that can deter 
developers from targeting these types of sites.267 Sites receiving an E-designation or 
ERD for hazardous materials are precisely that: real property that the City believes 
presents a reasonable risk of contamination.268 Therefore, the treatment group for 
the purposes of this Article’s analysis is defined as tax lots that received hazardous 
materials E-designation or ERD. For simplicity, these types of lots will be referred 
to as “brownfields” or “treatment” in the remainder of Part IV. 
Because the overwhelming majority of hazardous materials E-designated/ERD 
sites are located in rezoned areas,269 the analysis in this Section is limited to parts of 
New York City that have been rezoned.270 Interestingly, over 80% of the sites 
enrolled in the NYC VCP—which could, in theory, be anywhere in the City—are 
located in areas rezoned between 2002 and 2016.271 This trend is consistent with the 
theory that developers are enjoying the benefits of the program to develop properties 
that they would have developed anyway. Of course, this observation cannot be 
conclusively established based on the overlap alone, which is why the analysis of 
redevelopment trends discussed in this Section is necessary to answer whether 
developers are receiving a benefit for actions they would have taken anyway. 
 
2.  Measuring Redevelopment Rates 
 
The estimation strategy measures variation in redevelopment rates of tax lots 
in rezoned areas of New York City before and after 2010—the year in which the 
City created the NYC VCP. A tax lot is deemed to undergo redevelopment on a 
particular year if the Department of Buildings granted a building permit for new 
construction or major alteration that year.272 For each rezoned area and year, the rate 
of redevelopment is calculated as follows: for the treatment group, the area of 
brownfields—i.e., lots receiving E-designation or ERD for hazardous materials—
that received a building permit on year X in rezoned area Y, divided by the total area 
of brownfields in rezoned area Y. The same approach is used for the control group, 
that is, the area of non-brownfields that received a building permit on year X in 
rezoned area Y divided by the total area of non-brownfields in rezoned area Y. The 
Appendix provides further detail on how redevelopment rates are calculated.273 
                                               
267 See supra Section I.B.1. 
268 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 11-15 (“The designation (E) or an environmental 
restrictive declaration . . . indicate that environmental requirements pertaining to potential 
hazardous materials . . . impacts have been established.” (emphasis added)). 
269 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.  
270 The analysis relies on a shapefile of areas rezoned between 2002 and 2016, which 
constrains our analysis to that period. However, roughly 80% of the rezonings to date have 
occurred within that period of time.  
271 This estimate was obtained using geographic information system mapping 
technology.  
272 Specifically, major alterations that will change use, egress, or occupancy. 
273 See infra Appendix.  
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3.  Isolating the Effect of the NYC VCP 
 
To make an accurate estimation of how the NYC VCP may have affected the 
redevelopment rate of brownfields, it is critical to consider other factors that could 
mask or distort that effect. Given that the variations in the real estate market are 
accounted for because the control group is subject to these same fluctuations, the 
main source of distortion could come from changes in federal or state legislation or 
policies during the estimation period.  
 
(a)  Federal Programs 
 
The most important federal brownfield redevelopment programs were 
introduced in 2002 by the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act.274 The Act included legal protections for bona fide prospective 
purchasers of brownfields and the creation of economic incentives administered by 
the Environmental Protection Agency.275 However, private developers are not 
eligible to receive these federal incentives directly; only state, local, tribal 
governments, and certain “quasi-governmental entit[ies]” may do so.276 Therefore, 
in the case of New York City, fluctuations in the amounts granted by the federal 
government may affect the cost of maintaining the City’s programs,277 but they do 
not directly change developers’ incentives to redevelop brownfields. The same is 
true for the financial assistance provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development: with very limited exceptions, the parties that are eligible to 
receive these types of economic incentives are state, tribal, and local governments.278  
Another important incentive for brownfield redevelopment was the 
Brownfields Expensing Tax Incentive, also referred to as the “Section 198 cleanup 
                                               
274 Pub. L No. 107-118, 115 Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
9601, 9604, 9605, 9607, 9622, 9628).  
275 Assessment grants, cleanup grants, job training grants, revolving loan fund, 
Brownfields Area-Wide Planning program. See Brownfields Grant Fact Sheet Search, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://cfpub.epa.gov/bf_factsheets/ [https://perma.cc/S6HU-8ES6] 
(last visited Feb. 4, 2020) (listing the recipients of the grants, the state or territory in which 
the grant will be used, and the purpose of the grant).  
276 See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(k)(1) (2018); see also id. § 9628(a) (discussing state response 
programs and the assistance to states). 
277 Insofar as the City could have been a grantee.  
278 Brownfields Economic Development Initiative, supra note 190. The community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) “provides financial assistance to eligible cities, towns, 
and villages.” Homes and Community Renewal: Community Development Block Grant, N.Y. 
STATE, https://hcr.ny.gov/community-development-block-grant [https://perma.cc/M2L5-
FLSS] (last visited Feb. 5, 2020). Section 108 Loan Guarantee Program assistance is granted 
to “public entities.” See 24 C.F.R. § 570.702 (2020). The main exception is the Sustainable 
Communities Regional Planning Grant program, for which non-profit organizations are also 
eligible. 
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deduction.”279 This program was created in 1997 and discontinued on December 31, 
2011.280 Therefore, some years when the deduction was active fall within this 
Article’s study period (2002–2016). However, there is reason to believe that the 
expiration of the Section 198 cleanup deduction did not have an important effect on 
brownfield redevelopment in New York City. As EPA stated in a 2011 report, this 
tax incentive was not frequently used.281 Actual usage figures for the tax incentive 
suggest that, while it was more broadly utilized in New York City in the last few 
years it was available, the number of lots for which it was claimed was small.282 
 
(b)  State Programs 
 
New York State’s brownfield programs date back to 1994, with the creation of 
the Voluntary Cleanup Program.283 In 2003, the State launched the Brownfields 
Cleanup Program (“BCP”), which, unlike its predecessor, included tax credits and 
liability protection.284 In 2005 and 2006, New York State’s Department of 
Environmental Conservation (“DEC”) adopted two measures that drastically 
reduced the eligibility of New York City sites to join the state BCP. In 2005, DEC 
issued a guidance document limiting the BCP to properties with high contamination 
levels.285 In 2006, DEC’s new regulations excluded sites with historic fill—a type 
of potentially contaminated fill that is very common in New York City—from the 
BCP.286  
The New York legislature also amended the BCP in 2008 to introduce caps on 
the tax credits associated with the program.287 Because this Article’s estimation 
strategy relies on redevelopment and not enrollment, and redevelopment takes place 
after the cleanup, any effect of this legislative amendment on redevelopment would 
be perceived, at the earliest, several months later (i.e., after the cleanup is 
completed). For this reason, the 2008 amendment could affect the analysis in this 
Article, which is based on a comparison of redevelopment rates before and after 
2010. Given that the State provides information about the sites enrolled in the BCP, 
and enrollment is necessary to be eligible to receive tax credits, these sites have been 
removed from the sample altogether to minimize any effect that the 2008 
amendment could have on the estimation of the effects of the NYC VCP. 
 
                                               
279 See supra II.B.1. 
280 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS TAX INCENTIVES GUIDE, supra note 
182, at 3. 
281 Id.  
282 Analysis of Properties Claiming Section 198 Cleanup Deduction in New York 
State (Feb. 5, 2013) (dataset) (on file with author). 
283 DINAPOLI, supra note 250, at 1.   
284 See id. at 2. 
285 McIntyre et al., supra note 174. 
286 Id. at n. 5. 
287 DINAPOLI, supra note 250, at 2, 19. 
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4.  Results and Discussion 
 
The performance of the NYC VCP has been impressive in various respects, as 
enrollment and efficiency figures corroborate.288 As explained in more detail in the 
Appendix, however, the empirical estimation suggests that the redevelopment rate 
of brownfields in New York City did not increase in a statistically significant manner 
after the creation of the NYC VCP.289 Given that enrollment in the program is high, 
this finding is consistent with the theory that enrollees may be using the NYC VCP 
to clean up and redevelop sites that would likely be selected even in the absence of 
this program. These results, however, do not automatically support the conclusion 
that the NYC VCP is not playing a valuable role. In fact, it allows the New York 
City Office of Environmental Remediation to supervise the cleanup of contaminated 
sites that may otherwise be redeveloped without government oversight. It is 
important to note, however, that many of the sites enrolled in the NYC VCP would 
be subject to governmental control anyway given that the majority of these 
properties are E-designated or have received an ERD, which means they cannot 
receive a building permit without the environmental agency’s prior approval.290 
The reason why the NYC VCP may not be increasing the redevelopment rate 
of brownfields is likely to be related, at least in part, to the structure of its incentives. 
As explained at length below, the NYC VCP offers a covenant not to sue, but does 
not provide the type of stronger liability protections that some state programs—
including New York State—afford their participants.291 The relative weakness of the 
NYC VCP covenant may deter risk-averse developers from targeting certain types 
of brownfields. Moreover, the economic incentives granted by the City are 
substantially lower than those that the State offers to the participants in its state-level 
VCP. As a result, the NYC VCP subsidies may be insufficient to cover a 
consequential portion of the investigation and cleanup costs at many contaminated 
sites. 
 
V.  BROADER LESSONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
 
One could conclude this Article with the analysis in Parts III and IV. While this 
analysis alone would be useful to policymakers, it would miss an opportunity to 
suggest solutions and advance the conversation on issues that arise in other areas of 
the law.292 This Part uses the insights obtained through the analysis of NYC’s VCP 
                                               
288 See supra Section IV.B.  
289 See Appendix. 
290 See supra Section IV.C.1 and accompanying discussion.  
291 See infra Section V.B.  
292 See Robert L. Fischman & Lydia Barbash-Riley, Empirical Environmental 
Scholarship, 44 ECOLOGY L.Q. 767, 769 (2018) (pointing out, after a careful analysis of 
dozens of law review articles, that legal environmental scholarship often fails at providing 
useful policy recommendations that go beyond the identification of problems).  
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to propose a set of policy recommendations that apply broadly to voluntary programs 
and other third-generation tools. 
 
A.  Making Regulatory Programs More Effective: The Need for More 
Comprehensive Data Collection 
 
Consistently with what numerous adaptive management scholars have stated,293 
Parts III and IV of this Article strongly suggest that policymakers’ ability to improve 
government programs is tied to how well they can evaluate the success of these 
programs.294 However, one of the most common obstacles to assessing the 
performance of a government program is the lack of sufficient high-quality data.295 
Examples of how information gaps can complicate the resolution of environmental 
problems abound. Some of the difficulties in dealing with nonpoint sources of water 
pollution, for instance, are a result of insufficient data on the origin, amounts, and 
nature of this type of diffuse contamination.296  
As explained below, in the brownfield context, creating accurate and up-to-date 
inventories of the sources and location of contaminated sites is of crucial importance. 
However, the quality of these inventories matters. In a 2002 amendment to 
CERCLA, Congress created several financial incentives for brownfield 
redevelopment but conditioned states’ eligibility to receive certain federal grants on 
the inclusion of a “[t]imely survey and inventory of brownfield sites in the State” in 
the states’ cleanup programs.297 The problem with the 2002 amendment was that 
                                               
293 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for 
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2014) (explaining that agencies should 
have monitoring tools and other assessment methods in place to be able to evaluate their 
programs); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 424, 429 (2010) (pointing out that “management policy must put a premium on 
collecting information, establishing measurements of success, monitoring outcomes, using 
new information to adjust existing approaches”).  
294 See supra Sections III.B., IV.B.  
295 See supra Section III.B (noting that without enough information about the location 
of brownfields, it is not possible to assess the success of VCPs); Holly Doremus, Adaptive 
Management as an Information Problem, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1455, 1458 (2011) (highlighting 
that the feasibility of adaptive management lies on the availability of information). 
296 See Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based Controls Fail: 
Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 31–32 (2002); REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY, 
supra note 105, at 605. 
297 Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. 107-
118, 115 Stat. 2356, 2376 (2002); see 42 U.S.C. § 9628(a)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2018) (discussing 
assistance to States in the form of federal grants and the elements of a State response program 
including the timely survey and inventory of brownfield sites in the State).  
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“taking reasonable steps” to create an inventory also sufficed to qualify for these 
CERCLA grants.298  
This lenient standard that required states to merely take reasonable steps 
towards creating inventories led to the brownfield lists that can barely be considered 
an inventory. Vermont’s list, for example, contains 176 active sites in the entire state 
as of April 2020.299 Connecticut’s inventory only includes sites that have received 
state or EPA grants or loans and sites that are enrolled in any of the state liability 
relief programs.300 In other words, Connecticut’s and Vermont’s inventories are 
compilations of other lists of brownfields, and they do not include the most 
important sites: contaminated properties that are not yet taking advantage of any 
program and that could be good candidates for redevelopment in the future. In 
defense of these states, it must be acknowledged that the challenge of creating more 
comprehensive inventories is that identifying and assessing contaminated sites is a 
laborious and expensive task. 
Despite how cumbersome creating inventories of the sources and location of 
brownfields can be, there are three main reasons why these types of inventories can 
be very valuable—as long as they are comprehensive and accurate. The most 
straightforward advantage of brownfield inventories is that they allow policymakers, 
community groups, developers, and the public to know the location of the 
brownfields in a given jurisdiction, allowing them the potential to minimize any 
negative health impacts.  
Of course, the utility of this information will also depend on how 
comprehensive the inventory is. Lists of brownfields that merely include 
information already available elsewhere—as with Connecticut’s inventory—may be 
convenient but are not contributing to the identification of new brownfield sites. 
New York City is a good example of how to go beyond merely unifying existing 
lists. The City’s Searchable Property Environmental E-Database (“SPEED”) 
provides access to a variety of environmental remediation information.301 This 
database includes data from state and federal databases, but it also offers additional 
information. SPEED includes a map that contains a layer with vacant properties, 
specifying which of these lots are likely to present potentially contaminated fill 
                                               
298 42 U.S.C. § 9628(a)(1)(A)(i). Section 104(k) of CERCLA authorized grants that can 
be used to create these inventories. Id. § 9604(k)(2).  
299 See Vermont Environmental Research Tool: Brownfield Site List, VT. OFF. ST. 
WEBSITE: AGENCY OF NAT. RES., https://anrweb.vt.gov/DEC/ERT/Brownfields.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/7CFW-36QT] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020) (this number excludes those sites 
that have already obtained a certificate of completion or where no further action is 
contemplated).  
300 See Connecticut Brownfields Inventory, CONN. OFF. ST. WEBSITE: DEP’T OF ENERGY 
& ENVTL. PROT., http://www.ct.gov/deep/cwp/view.asp?a=2715&q=488996 [https://perma. 
cc/KN8T-UPDV] (last updated Oct. 25, 2019). 
301 See SPEED: Welcome to the SPEED Portal Help, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. 
REMEDIATION, https://maps.nyc.gov/moer/speed/help/public/SPEED_Portal_Help.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3RHG-ULSV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).  
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material.302 More remarkably, this database includes information about sites with a 
potential presence of hazardous substances, regardless of whether they are vacant or 
not.303 
The second advantage of creating comprehensive inventories of brownfields is 
that they can be instrumental in evaluating the success of VCPs. As explained in 
Section III.B, assessing the performance of VCPs requires having data that will 
allow a comparison of the pre- and post-program brownfield redevelopment trends. 
Comprehensive inventories can provide this information. For example, the list of 
potentially contaminated sites that New York City has been updating since the 1980s 
is what made it possible for the author of this Article to evaluate the effects of the 
NYC VCP. Another shortcoming of most brownfield lists is that they typically do 
not include properties that are not enrolled in a cleanup program.304 Non-enrolled 
sites could include brownfields or non-brownfields. As the empirical analysis in Part 
IV shows, this distinction is critical to be able to differentiate between the control 
and treatment groups,305 and account for the distortive effect that general variations 
in real estate development trends could have on the analysis of a particular 
program.306 Comprehensive inventories such as New York City’s SPEED solve this 
issue by also including sites that are not enrolled in any cleanup program and further 
specifying whether the sites are likely to be contaminated (e.g., properties that hosted 
manufacturing uses in the past).  
Third, comprehensive brownfield inventories can be key to ensuring broader 
supervision of cleanups by agencies. When a contaminated property is not part of an 
inventory, and thus not a known brownfield, developers often find themselves in a 
position to choose between two options. One option is cleaning the property up 
under the supervision of a government agency—perhaps by enrolling in a VCP—
and the other option is to conduct a so-called “at risk” cleanup, which is not 
government-supervised.307 By identifying previously unknown brownfields, 
comprehensive brownfield inventories can increase the number of supervised 
cleanups. This is especially so when a comprehensive inventory is coupled with a 
mechanism that prevents the reuse or redevelopment of the property until the agency 
administering the program considers that the site can be safely used for its intended 
                                               
302 SPEED: Layer Control Panel: Glossary: VPD Fill Properties, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. 
REMEDIATION, https://maps.nyc.gov/moer/speed/help/public/SPEED_Portal_Help.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3RHG-ULSV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019). 
303 As explained in Part IV, these are properties that have received hazardous materials 
E-designations or environmental restrictive declarations. See supra Section IV.C.1. 
304 See supra notes 299–300 and accompanying text. 
305 See supra Section IV.C.1 (describing how the control and treatment groups were 
defined). 
306 See supra Section IV.C.3 (explaining how these distortive effects were addressed in 
the empirical estimation). 
307 McIntyre, supra note 165, at 435. In NYC most cleanups may actually be performed 
“at-risk.” See id. (“[T]he number of at-risk cleanups routinely conducted in the city dwarfs 
the number of cleanups overseen by state regulators.”). 
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purpose—usually by finding that the property has been remediated or because 
cleanup is not necessary.  
This raises the following question: how does an agency implement the agency 
review mechanism? At least two alternatives are possible. One option is to withhold 
building permits for sites that are included in the inventory. The agency can then lift 
this prohibition when it is satisfied with the cleanup or with documentation showing 
that the site is either not contaminated or has levels of contamination that are 
compatible with the future use of the property.308 Another option is to require similar 
assurances when a new owner or operator intends to acquire control of the site. So-
called “transfer laws” have adopted this type of approach by relying on the former 
use of the property instead of on brownfield inventories to identify the sites to which 
the policy applies. For example, under New Jersey’s Industrial Site Recovery Act, 
owners or operators of “industrial establishments” may not transfer their property 
until it has been remediated or the agency has granted permission to proceed with 
the transaction.309  
While both of these alternatives provide an avenue to ensure that a government 
agency supervises the cleanups, both approaches are also most effective when they 
rely on the information provided by a comprehensive inventory of contaminated 
properties. A strategy requiring the investigation of sites based solely on whether it 
had a particular prior use—often industrial, as some transfer laws do310—would be 
overlooking many other types of potentially contaminated properties (e.g., those 
polluted as a result of commercial activities such as dry cleaning or lots that were 




In sum, having more accurate and comprehensive data about environmental 
risks is of great importance. In some cases, knowing more about the location of 
environmental hazards can help citizens reduce their exposure. Just as importantly, 
by allowing for more thorough assessments of the performance of government 
initiatives, this information can play a crucial role in improving regulatory programs 
and implementing them more effectively. 
 
                                               
308 This is the approach adopted by New York City with its E-designation program. See 
Larry Schnapf, Property Contamination and Its Impact on Commercial Leasing in NYC, 88 
N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 32, 33–35 (Feb. 2016).  
309 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9(a), (b)(1)–(2) (West 2019). See generally LARRY 
SCHNAPF, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY - BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND 
BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT § 7.03 (2015) (providing a thorough analysis of the 
disclosure and transfer requirements in the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act). 
310 See SCHNAPF, supra note 309.  
311 For example, properties affected by the migration of off-site contaminants or sites 
with underground storage tanks.  
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B.  Lessons for Environmental Federalism: Improving the Integration 
Between State and Local Programs 
 
Determining which level of government is best positioned to address a given 
environmental issue is a challenging task. Those in favor of a centralized model have 
cautioned against the dangers of state or local level regulation—pointing to race-to-
the-bottom or agency capture concerns.312 Proponents of a decentralized approach 
to environmental regulation, on the other hand, have noted that state and local 
agencies tend to be closer to the problems and, as a result, are in a better position to 
tailor their programs to state or local conditions.313 Other scholars have posited that 
complex environmental issues need the involvement of various levels of 
government, in what they have referred to as “cooperative federalism,” “cooperative 
localism,” or other monikers.314  
This Article makes two important contributions to this ongoing debate. First, as 
Part IV illustrates, the argument that tailoring programs to local conditions can 
justify a strong local role is especially justified in the context of VCPs. The need for 
local regulation can arise, for example, when state law creates a “local regulatory 
gap.” As explained above, New York State’s brownfields program made certain 
types of properties that were particularly abundant in New York City ineligible to 
enroll in the state’s VCP.315 Without the creation of its local counterpart—the NYC 
VCP—the owners of many brownfields in the City would not have had a voluntary 
path to conduct agency-supervised cleanups in New York City.316  
Second, even when multiple levels of government cooperate to address an 
environmental problem, the success of a cooperative approach will depend on how 
integrated the different layers of regulation are. The remainder of this Section 
illustrates this point by first analyzing the challenges associated with integrating 
                                               
312 See supra Section I.A.3. As commentators have explained, “[t]raditional capture 
theory examines the extent to which regulated industries have captured their regulators.” 
Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 
49 (1993). 
313 Adler, supra note 24, at 137 (noting the advantage that states have over the federal 
government when tailoring policies to local conditions); Davidson, supra note 20, at 1034 
n.47 (“[E]nvironmental protection is increasingly a local government issue.”); Nolon, supra 
note 25, at 415 (“The diversity of local conditions . . . suggests that centralized approaches 
to environmental protection are not necessarily desirable when dealing with environmental 
problems.”). 
314 See Davidson, supra note 20, at 960 (using the term “cooperative localism”); Daniel 
C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495, 1554 (1999) 
(“The fact that environmental protection involves problems at various levels makes 
necessary a multi-tier regulatory structure with appropriate entities at the local, state, federal, 
and international levels.”); Snyder & Binder, supra note 20, at 247 (explaining that “a 
comprehensive approach involving multiple levels of government” is necessary to address 
environmental problems). 
315 See supra Section IV.A. 
316 See id. 
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state and local authority to provide liability protections in the context of VCPs and 
then suggesting strategies to navigate these complexities. 
The NYC VCP is a good example of why local governments may not be able 
to provide enrollees in their VCPs with an adequate level of liability protections 
without adequate state legislation. Under the NYC VCP, sites that have received a 
certificate of completion under this city program receive two types of assurances. 
First, the City will not require further investigation or remediation at these sites, 
subject to certain exceptions—if necessary to protect public health or the 
environment, if the applicant committed fraud, or if there is a violation of the cleanup 
agreement.317 Second, the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (“NYSDEC” or “the State”) has agreed—in a memorandum entered 
into with New York City’s Office of Environmental Remediation—that it “does not 
plan or anticipate taking administrative or judicial enforcement action seeking to 
require a removal or remedial action” at NYC VCP sites.318 However, this 
memorandum also states that nothing in the agreement “limits NYSDEC’s authority 
to take action where it deems appropriate.”319 
Given that, in general, the State is one of the most likely actors to initiate an 
enforcement action with respect to a contaminated site, one could easily argue that 
the protection afforded under the NYC VCP is not particularly robust. A comparison 
of the NYC VCP assurances with those provided under the state program supports 
this claim.  
First, the memorandum of agreement between the State and the City notes that, 
while the State does not plan to take enforcement action with respect to NYC VCP 
sites, it still reserves the right to do so. In contrast, the state statute governing the 
protections for state program’s applicants guarantees that the “applicant shall not be 
liable to the state upon any statutory or common law cause of action.”320 Second, the 
liability exemption for the state program’s applicants goes beyond the remediated 
site and includes contamination that, while having originated on that site, migrated 
to other properties.321 In other words, the owner of a site that receives a certificate 
                                               
317 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-906(a)(2), (b) (2019).  
318 Memorandum of Agreement Between the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation and the New York City Office of Environmental Remediation 
4 (June 7, 2010) (emphasis added) [hereinafter NYC-NYSDEC MOA]. 
319 Id. 
320 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.1 (2020). The statute includes certain 
exceptions in cases of danger to public health or the environment, non-compliance with the 
cleanup agreement, fraud, change of use of a property with restricted use, etc. Id. § 27-
1421.2(a).  
321 New York’s liability protection includes “statutory or common law causes of action 
arising out of . . . contamination in, on or emanating from the brownfield site” that receives 
a certificate of completion. Id. § 27-1421.1 (emphasis added). Participants, however, may be 
required to clean up off-site contamination. This higher standard is applied because these 
types of enrollees can be liable based on more than mere ownership of the site (e.g., they 
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of completion under the state program will not be required to clean up off-site 
contamination. Participation in the NYC VCP, however, currently provides no 
protection against state enforcement with respect to off-site contamination.322  
Third, the liability protection for sites enrolled in the state program has the 
additional advantage of limiting third-party claims to recover cleanup costs from the 
enrollee in the program.323 The provisions governing the liability of those who obtain 
a certificate of completion under the NYC VCP, however, offer no third-party 
contribution protection. The following table summarizes the differences in liability 
protections between the NYC VCP and state program sites:  
 
 Liability to State (on-site 
contamination) 















No exemption No protection 
 
These liability gaps can discourage developers from pursuing construction 
projects in contaminated sites.324 In fact, the evolution of federal law suggests that 
covenant-not-to-sue-type protections—like in the memorandum of agreement 
between the City and the State—are often perceived as insufficient. Before the 
                                               
contributed to the contamination). See id. § 27-1405.1(a) (defining “participant” to include 
parties responsible through other “statutory or common law liability” principles). 
322 The memorandum of agreement notes that NYSDEC “does not plan or anticipate 
taking administrative or judicial enforcement action . . . at a site addressed by this 
Agreement,” i.e., sites enrolled in the City’s VCP, as long as sites remain in compliance with 
the VCP and once sites receive a certificate of completion. NYC-NYSDEC MOA, supra 
note 318, at 4 (emphasis added). Off-site contamination is not protected from liability, and 
indeed the agreement directs the City to coordinate with NYSDEC regarding properties 
where contamination came from off-site sources. See id.   
323 A person who has received a certificate of completion is not liable to third parties 
for costs related to the contamination that has been addressed at the specific site under the 
state program. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.6; Larry Schnapf, New York 
Environmental Laws Affecting Commercial Leasing Transactions, 88 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N J. 
30, 33 (2016). Obtaining a certificate of completion under the state program also protects 
enrollees against contribution claims filed under CERCLA. See HLP Properties, LLC v. 
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, No. 14 Civ. 01383 LGS, 2014 WL 6604741, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2014) (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 596 
F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 2010)).  
324 ENVTL. LAW INST., A GUIDEBOOK FOR BROWNFIELD PROPERTY OWNERS 8–9 
(1999), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d9.11.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN69-
V2BK] (discussing liability and liability insurance for developers because of the liability 
challenges they face). 
 
852 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
creation of the bona fide prospective purchaser protection, and also before it was 
extended to tenants in 2018, EPA issued guidance documents indicating 
circumstances in which it was unlikely to use its enforcement power with respect to 
sites owned or occupied by these types of landowners or tenants.325 Nevertheless, a 
legislative amendment later codified this policy to alleviate the justifiable concerns 
that EPA’s guidance documents did not completely shield these types of potentially 
responsible parties from federal enforcement actions, and offered no protection 
against third-party claims.326  
In light of CERCLA’s complex covenant-not-to-sue history, why would the 
State be reluctant to provide liability protection for NYC VCP projects that is 
comparable to that offered to the state program’s enrollees? A likely explanation is 
that there were concerns about potential risks of a local government running a type 
of program that had previously been administered at the state level.327 In other words, 
such limited liability protection probably resulted from hesitancy about whether the 
newly created VCP, run by an office that had just come into existence, would 
adequately ensure that cleanups were sufficiently protective of the environment and 
human health.  
Regardless of whether limiting the scope of local liability protections was a 
reasonable approach at the time or not, there are multiple reasons that support 
reassessing the covenant-not-to-sue dilemma in the NYC VCP context. First, the 
program has been in place for over eight years, and, to the author’s knowledge, there 
have been no reasonable public allegations that cleanups conducted under the NYC 
VCP were not ensuring the protection of human health or the environment. Second, 
the cleanup standards and guidelines that apply to remediation carried out under the 
NYC VCP are set by the State, not the City.328 Therefore, cleanups throughout the 
state must meet the same standards, regardless of whether they are performed under 
the state program or the NYC VCP.  
Third, if a particular cleanup happens to be inadequate, the level of liability 
protection that the state provides already offers enough flexibility to address these 
types of issues. As noted above, the state still maintains its authority to require 
additional investigation or remediation of sites in cases where the cleanup is “no 
longer protective of public health or the environment,” the cleanup agreement has 
been violated, the applicant committed fraud, or there is a “change in an 
environmental standard, factor, or criterion.”329 Therefore, affording the same 
treatment to NYC VCP sites with respect to liability protection would leave the State 
                                               
325 See supra Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 (explaining how these defenses were 
recognized by statute after a period during which EPA had provided assurances that it would 
not bring enforcement actions).  
326 See supra Sections II.A.1. and II.A.2. 
327 This understanding is based on informal conversations with government officials. 
See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 13. 
328 See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 24-903(d) (2020) (“Cleanup standards and remedial 
selection criteria shall be consistent with standards and criteria applicable to the state 
brownfield cleanup program.”). 
329 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1421.2(a)(i)–(iv) (2019). 
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ample opportunity to act if a cleanup conducted under the NYC VCP were found to 
be substandard in any way. 
Last, there are a number of benefits associated with expanding the scope of the 
liability protections at the local level. Stronger protections from state enforcement 
actions and third-party claims would be a valuable incentive for the redevelopment 
of any site that is eligible to join the NYC VCP. This improved liability protection, 
however, would be particularly advantageous for NYC VCP sites from which 
contamination may have migrated to other neighboring properties. As noted above, 
under the current framework, the State may require enrollees in the NYC VCP to 
remediate off-site contamination. Increasing the liability protection to match that 
offered to sites in the state program would solve this problem by protecting NYC 
VCP enrollees against enforcement actions in these situations.  
It is important to note that the proposed expansion in liability protections would 
not necessarily entail leaving off-site contamination unaddressed. Even if enrollees 
in the NYC VCP would not be liable for the migrated contamination, they would 
still have to deal with the source of contamination, which would theoretically 
prevent future releases and further migration of pollutants from the site that is being 
remediated. Moreover, regardless of the level of liability protection, enrollees in the 
program are going to assess the site that is being redeveloped and share the results 
with the City.330 This process facilitates the identification of contaminants that 
present a risk of migration and allows the City and the State to become aware of the 
potential existence of a contamination plume that, without the involvement of a 
developer, may have otherwise remained unidentified.  
The analysis in this Section offers an important lesson that policymakers can 
apply in other states. With regard to local programs specifically, if the concern is 
that a newly created local agency may not be able to guarantee quality cleanups, a 
possible solution is to grant liability protections in two stages. During the first stage, 
liability protections could be more modest, for example, providing a level of 
protection similar to that in the NYC VCP. If, after a certain period of time or a 
given number of cleanups, the State determines that remediations performed under 
the local program meet the necessary standards, the liability protections for new 
enrollees could be increased to match those offered under the state program. 
 
C.  Efficient Voluntary Programs: The Importance of Minimizing Delays 
 
While efficiency is desirable in any government initiative, this feature is of 
critical importance when dealing with voluntary programs. Voluntary programs are 
viable only if they are able to recruit a sufficient number of enrollees. In addition to 
the financial assistance that the program may offer, potential enrollees also give 
significant weight to the efficiency with which the agency runs the program.  
                                               
330 The regulations require that an applicant submit a copy of the “remedial 
investigation report and a remedial action work plan” to the city agency running the NYC 
VCP. See 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1404.c.3 (2019). 
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As the analysis in Part IV of this Article confirms, running a VCP efficiently—
which includes, of course, avoiding delays—can be very useful in attracting the 
interest of potential new program participants. Scholars examining this question in 
the context of VCPs note that the delays associated with government approvals can 
easily deter developers from pursuing brownfield redevelopment projects.331 Even 
when that is not the case, if the programs are truly voluntary, developers’ willingness 
to avoid bureaucratic delays can lead them to dodge the VCP and conduct at-risk, 
unsupervised cleanups instead.332  
How, then, can policymakers make their voluntary programs more efficient? 
The analysis of the NYC VCP yields three very valuable insights to that effect. First, 
as interviews with developers, lawyers, and consultants confirm, the agency running 
the NYC VCP is very quick responding to requests, especially when compared to 
other programs.333 Interviewees stressed the ease with which interested parties can 
schedule a meeting with agency officials on short notice and, more broadly, the 
swiftness of the different approvals that are required to move forward with the 
cleanup process.334 This is one of the factors that may explain the differences 
observed in Part IV between the NYC VCP and the New York State program in 
terms of average time to cleanup completion.335  
Second, interviewees have noted that the NYC VCP is very predictable and that 
this strength has contributed to their decision to enroll subsequent projects.336 The 
process starts with a pre-application meeting to discuss “the suitability of the 
property for participation in the program” and other strategic aspects of the remedial 
investigation.337 To make the process more predictable and efficient, the office 
administering the NYC VCP provides a set of templates of the main documents that 
the enrollee will need to provide throughout the process, which detail the results of 
the investigation as well as the remedial plan.338  
Third, participation in a VCP facilitates developers’ access to financing, 
especially when the agency running the program supports enrollees’ efforts to secure 
                                               
331 See, e.g., Bacot & O’Dell supra note 221, at 148.  
332 See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 115, at 292 (explaining how “administrative delays” 
during environmental reviews explained the low enrollment numbers in Ohio’s VCP). 
333 The developers, lawyers, and consultants that were interviewed had experience with 
other VCPs—at least with the New York state program and, often, with other states’ VCPs. 
334 INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 5. 
335 See supra Section IV.B. Another factor that may explain this difference, however, 
is the lower levels of contamination present in sites enrolled in New York City’s VCP. See 
supra Section IV.A. 
336 INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 5. 
337 14 R.C.N.Y. § 43-1404(a) (2019).  
338 NYC Voluntary Cleanup Program, N.Y.C. OFF. ENVTL. REMEDIATION, 
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/oer/html/voluntary-cleanup-program/vcp.shtml [https://perma. 
cc/E4JZ-6SJA] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) (“Each of the[ application] documents has a well-
defined template, or boilerplate, that simplifies preparation and enables predictable and 
timely navigation of the NYC VCP.”).  
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it. Enrollment in any VCP suggests that a government agency is supervising the 
investigation and cleanup activities. Mere enrollment, therefore, usually provides a 
certain level of comfort to lenders. In some cases, the issue may arise that a 
developer is seeking financing before formally enrolling the site in the VCP. This 
may raise doubts as to whether the landowner will be able to enroll the property in 
the VCP at all. To address this problem, the office administering the NYC VCP will 
often issue a “pre-VCP enrollment ‘comfort letter,’” which shows the lender that the 
borrower is on the right track and taking the necessary steps that will lead to the 
enrollment of the site in the NYC VCP.339 
 
D.  Towards Simpler Regulatory Tools: The Brownfield-Renewable Energy Link 
 
Professor Richard Epstein, in his seminal book Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, claimed that today’s proclivity to make rules more complex has a negative 
impact on “the productive efficiency of the society they regulate.”340 As shown in 
Parts III and IV of this article, having intricate regulatory programs with many 
different goals can also complicate the task of evaluating and improving them. This 
Section examines these concerns in the context of so-called brightfields, the 
increasingly popular idea of dedicating brownfields and other contaminated sites to 
renewable energy production. Specifically, the question is whether cleanup 
programs are the right tool to incentivize this particular use, or if making VCPs more 
complex in that regard is undesirable.341  
 
1.  The Notion of Brightfield  
 
Contaminated lands have the potential of hosting sufficient renewable energy 
installations to meet most states’ renewable energy generation goals, and an 
important share of these targets could be achieved using solar energy.342 To promote 
the installation of solar energy technologies on brownfields, the U.S. Department of 
Energy (“DOE”) and EPA launched the so-called “brightfields initiative” in 2000.343 
                                               
339 Schnapf, supra note 308, at 33. The Office of Environmental Remediation also 
issues other types of letter, for example, when the contamination levels at the site do not 
require further action. See id. 
340 EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 307. 
341 See Bacot & O’Dell, supra note 221, at 148. 
342 Jacqueline L. Waite, Land Reuse in Support of Renewable Energy Development, 66 
LAND USE POL’Y 105, 105–06, 108–09 (2017) (including in this analysis “Superfund sites, 
RCRA corrective action sites, Brownfield grantees, and sites that were identified through 
EPA’s Landfill Methane Outreach Program,” and some “state abandoned mine inventories 
and/or clean-up programs.”).  
343 Lori Ribeiro, Waste to Watts: A “Brightfield” Installation Has the Potential to Bring 
Renewed Life to a Brownfield Site, 8 REFOCUS 46, 46 (2007); see also CHRISTOPHER DE 
SOUSA & THIERRY B. SPIESS, INST. ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y, SUSTAINABLE BROWNFIELDS 
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The term “brightfield” has been used broadly to include “a ground-mounted solar 
array, a solar manufacturing plant, or a building with rooftop solar that is developed 
on a brownfield.”344 However, brightfield is traditionally used more narrowly to 
describe ground-mounted solar installations built on current or former 
brownfields.345 This Section applies this narrower definition when discussing 
brightfields. 
One of the reasons why the term brightfields is primarily associated with 
ground-mounted solar arrays is that, once a building has been erected on the 
property, the decision of whether to install rooftop solar will generally not depend 
on whether the site was originally a brownfield. As a brightfields expert has 
expressed it, rooftop solar is “[t]he type of [solar] project [on brownfields] most 
likely to succeed [ . . . ] [because] [t]hese projects have occurred without DOE 
intervention [given that] it is fairly straightforward to install [a photovoltaic array] 
on a building, whether or not on a brownfield.”346 With these projects, the developer 
obtains the revenue generated by the building plus all the additional benefits of 
rooftop solar. A ground-mounted installation, on the other hand, would preclude 
property owners from maximizing the use of their property. The trends observed 
with rooftop solar also apply to other types of solar installations that are compatible 
with additional uses of the property, such as parking lot solar canopies. In these 
cases, the solar panels do not negatively interfere with the use of the property as a 
parking facility and can actually enhance it by providing shade to its users.347 
 
2.  Should VCPs Promote the Creation of Brightfields? 
 
For the reasons noted in the preceding paragraph, a building with a rooftop solar 
installation is often going to be a superior option to a ground-mounted brightfield. 
A more important and thorny question, however, is whether, in the specific case of 
                                               
CONSORTIUM, BROCKTON BRIGHTFIELD, BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS: A SUSTAINABLE 
BROWNFIELD REVITALIZATION BEST PRACTICE 1 (May 10, 2013), https://brownfields.org. 
uic.edu/research-results/documents/BrocktonBrightfield-finalforposting-May102013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/38KK-KRGN] (describing the historical basis and coinage of the term 
“brightfield”). 
344 See Ribeiro, supra note 343, at 46. 
345 See, e.g., Steve Goodbody, From Brownfields to Brightfields, SOLAR POWER 
WORLD, (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.solarpowerworldonline.com/2017/03/from-
brownfields-to-brightfields/ [https://perma.cc/X78T-RNSS] (using the term to refer to a 
ground-mounted brightfield in Billerica, MA); ROBERT HERSH, CTR. FOR PUB, ENVTL. 
OVERSIGHT, PROMOTING SOLAR POWER ON BROWNFIELDS IN BROCKTON, MASSACHUSETTS 
6 (2010), http://www.cpeo.org/pubs/Brockton.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZ22-LQZP] (using 
the term to refer to a ground-mounted brightfield in Brockton, MA).  
346 See Ribeiro, supra note 343, at 49. 
347 Parking Lot Solar Canopy Installation, EMPIRE: RENEWABLE ENERGY, 
http://solarbyempire.com/why-solar/solar-options/118-parking-lot-canopies [https://perma. 
cc/9DWL-N8E4] (last visited Jan. 6, 2020). 
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contaminated sites, VCPs should favor brightfields over constructions with no solar 
panels or vice-versa. There are multiple factors that can affect the relative 
desirability of these two alternatives, such as the need for more distributed 
generation in a certain area, its solar irradiance, the prevailing land characteristics, 
or contamination type, etc. Therefore, there is no universal answer to this 
conundrum. However, the following considerations can be useful when making 
decisions about whether to prioritize brightfield developments.  
First, neither brightfields nor non-solar constructions are better uses for 
brownfields per se. Brightfields have the advantage of generating energy from a 
renewable source, and constructions can host a virtually limitless number of socially 
beneficial uses and activities, including housing, commercial, and industrial uses. 
Thus, it is not surprising that various levels of government have created incentives 
for many of the different uses to which a property—brownfield or not—may be 
put.348 This has resulted in a particular balance of incentives for these various uses 
in each locality. Even brownfield programs already tend to reflect the priorities of a 
given jurisdiction—e.g., revitalizing low-income areas, creating more affordable 
housing, or accelerating the cleanup of brownfields located in the floodplain.349  
Second, it is unclear that the presence of contamination should, by itself, tip the 
scales in favor of using contaminated sites as brightfields. One could claim that, 
because ground-mounted panels do not typically require as thorough a cleanup as 
other uses, brightfield development lowers remediation costs, making brightfields 
the more economical choice.350 However, the savings are not always going to be 
substantial. For one thing, a building used for industrial or commercial purposes may 
not necessitate a complete cleanup either.351 For another, mounting solar panels on 
contaminated land can present a variety of issues that may affect the total cost of the 
solar installation.352 The potential for ground disturbance is a key complication that 
                                               
348 These include, for example, incentives to promote new manufacturing uses or 
housing. See N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., THE EFFECTS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX 
CREDIT (LIHTC) 1 (2017) (describing the basic features of the “largest federal subsidy for 
the development and preservation of affordable housing.”); Vicki Been, “Exit” as a 
Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 513–14 (1991) (explaining the various mechanisms that many states 
have in place to attract industrial activity). 
349 See, e.g., 14 R.C.N.Y §§ 43-1417(a), (b) (2020) (providing higher grants for 
development projects “on publicly-owned sites, at affordable and/or supportive housing” and 
on “designated coastal flood zone[s].”). 
350 See Warren, supra note 33 at 2 (“The nature of renewable energy projects is such 
that they often do not require full remediation.”). 
351 Under state law, commercial or industrial uses may have more permissive cleanup 
standards. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS., tit. 6 § 375-6.8(b) (2019) (requiring 
different contaminant levels for residential, restricted-residential, commercial, and industrial 
uses). 
352 See Gil Hough & Chad Fairless, Brownfield to Brightfield Initiative in Oak Ridge, 
TN 3 (WM2012 Conference, Paper No. 12346, 2012) (on file with the Utah Law Review); 
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solar developers may have to deal with. For example, if contamination is present but 
has been contained or capped through “solidification, stabilization, or encasing,” the 
weight of solar trackers and transformers can lead to sinking, thereby compromising 
the integrity of the cap.353 Moreover, the degree of ground disturbance that is 
advisable based on the contamination at a particular site can also limit the type—or 
affect the cost—of the solar installations that can be used on that property.354 
Third, all other incentives being equal, brightfields tend to be more viable in 
non-urban areas for two reasons: property sizes and access to light. The size of a 
property can have a significant impact on whether a brightfield development would 
be viable. Utility-scale solar energy projects, for example, generally require at least 
five acres of land to produce one megawatt of power, which is the threshold to be 
considered economically feasible.355 Some studies have situated the median size of 
brownfields at 5 acres or more.356 While it may not be unusual for brownfields in 
rural areas to meet these requirements, in densely populated urban areas brownfield 
sites tend to be substantially smaller. For example, the analysis in Part IV of the 
brownfields enrolled in the NYC VCP revealed that these sites have an average area 
of less than half an acre.357  
Unobstructed access to sunlight is another critical factor for the success of any 
solar energy installation.358 For a brightfield to receive direct sunlight for as many 
hours as possible, shading from trees or nearby buildings must be minimized.359 As 
with the previous factor, the likelihood that a ground-mounted solar installation will 
be viable is lower in more densely populated areas. Even in the rare instances where 
an urban lot may be suffering no shading at the time the solar array is installed, 
densely populated areas present a higher “risk that neighbors will erect buildings or 
plant trees on their properties that shade the panel[s].”360 
Although the relative undesirability of turning urban brownfields into 
brightfields may lead some to think that incentivizing brightfields in rural areas may 
                                               
Thierry Spiess & Christopher De Sousa, Barriers to Renewable Energy Development on 
Brownfields, 18 J. ENVTL. POL’Y & PLAN. 507, 507 (2016). 
353 Spiess & De Sousa, supra note 352, at 516. 
354 Hough & Fairless, supra note 352, at 4–5. 
355 See id. at 2; Rebecca R. Hernandez et al., Solar Energy Development Impacts on 
Land Cover Change and Protected Areas, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13,579, 13,579 
(2015). 
356 Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Something 
or the Timing of the Shrewd? 8 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 04–46, 2004), 
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/10660?ln=en [https://perma.cc/G8LW-R4TZ].  
357 Luis Inaraja Vera, NYC Brownfields Dataset (Aug. 2018) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Inaraja Vera, Dataset]. 
358 Waite, supra note 342, at 107.  
359 Transforming Brownfields to Brightfields (B2B), ENVTL. L. & POL’Y CTR., 
http://elpc.org/b2b/ [https://perma.cc/G8LW-R4TZ] (last visited June 4, 2018).  
360 Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different Light, 
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851, 853 (2010). 
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be a better idea, market forces, brownfield redevelopment incentives, and the 
existing regulations already tend to favor the development of brightfields in non-
urban locations. In fact, most brightfield success stories involve sites in low-
density—often rural or exurban—areas.361 There can be cases, however, in which 
the balance of incentives for these different uses is disrupted. Some municipalities, 
for example, have passed moratoria to halt renewable energy projects altogether 
while they make the necessary changes to zoning regulations to better accommodate 
these projects in the future.362 After these moratoria are lifted, additional incentives 
may help these types of projects gain traction in higher density areas.  
In short, this analysis shows that adding excessive complexity to VCPs to 
promote brightfields over other uses can be counterproductive. Brightfields are not 
intrinsically superior to other uses of land. Moreover, the fact that a property was or 
is contaminated does not necessarily make solar developments more valuable than 
other types of uses. There are areas—namely those with less population density—
where brightfields may be particularly appealing based on the need for distributed 
generation or because the prevailing type of property where the panels would be 
installed meets certain size or light exposure requirements. Existing incentives and 
market forces already spur the development of brightfields in these locations. 
Therefore, including additional mechanisms in VCPs to incentivize brightfield 
development on brownfields should not be treated as the default course of action. 
Default preferences for brightfields will often be unnecessary, and they will also 




In the current era of political polarization, voluntary programs are one of the 
critical tools that government agencies have at their disposal to achieve a wide array 
of goals. Unfortunately, policymakers often have a limited ability to improve 
voluntary initiatives because they lack the data to perform comprehensive 
assessments of these programs. This Article has shown that, in the few cases in 
which such information is available, a great deal can be learned from the study of 
voluntary environmental programs. This Article also explained the different reasons 
why, despite its cost, obtaining better data on environmental hazards should be a 
priority. The analysis of the first local Voluntary Cleanup Program yields additional 
insights, such as the critical role that municipal voluntary programs can play in 
                                               
361 See, e.g., HERSH, supra note 345, at 3–5 (describing development of a ground-
mounted brightfield at a site on the outskirts of Brockton, MA, a city 20 miles south of 
Boston); Goodbody, supra note 345 (displaying photographs of ground-mounted brightfields 
in several suburban areas of Massachusetts). 
362 THE NATURE CONSERVANCY & THE ALL. FOR CLEAN ENERGY N.Y., ACCELERATING 
LARGE-SCALE WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY IN NEW YORK: PRINCIPLES AND 
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addressing local regulatory gaps. Finally, there are ways in which agencies can make 
voluntary environmental initiatives more efficient and remove unnecessary 
complexity in order to maximize enrollment.  
 




To estimate whether the NYC VCP has had an effect on the redevelopment rate 
of brownfields, we use the following econometric model363: 
 
𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒-./
= 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- + 𝛽7𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/
+ 𝛽;𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠	𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟	𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/
+ 𝛽<	2𝑦𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- + 𝛽?𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2013/









J+ 𝜀-./  
 
In this model, “i” is the index for lots, “j” is the index for blocks or community 
districts, and “t” is the index for years. Only after a rezoning is there a chance that a 
lot will be classified as a brownfield (i.e., the lot will be E-designated or receive an 
ERD).364 In our regression sample, only those lots that were rezoned between 2002 
and 2016 are included. The outcome variable is whether lot “i” in block/community 
district “j” received a building permit in year “t,” which measures the redevelopment 
rate. Brownfieldi is a dummy indicating whether lot “i” has ever been designated as 
a brownfield during the 2002–2016 period. This dummy variable captures whether 
the brownfield lots, regardless of having been classified as a brownfield or being 
classified as a brownfield in the future, tend to have higher redevelopment rates 
compared to the rest of the lots in the rezoned areas.  
The control variables, Years before rezoneit and Years after rezoneit, capture 
whether redevelopments are more frequent before or after a rezoning takes place. 
The interaction term 2𝑦𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑- indicates whether 
brownfields tend to have a higher redevelopment rate once they are “discovered” by 
                                               
363 I owe a special thanks to Wei You for writing the equation, running the regression, 
and providing very valuable insights on the interpretation of the results. 
364 See supra Section IV.C.1. (explaining what E-designations and ERD are and how 
they are assigned to lots). 
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the rezoning processes.365 We consider a two-year lag because, once a lot is 
designated as a brownfield, it usually takes real estate developers approximately two 
years to clean up the field before they can obtain a permit to develop on it.366 
Post2013t is the time dummy that takes a value of 1 after 2013. We introduce this 
dummy because the NYC VCP was in effect since late 2010. Taking into account 
this two-year lag between the time that developers learned about the program and 
the time they were able to receive a building permit for a remediated property, we 
choose 2013 as the cutoff year. The triple interaction term, 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡2013/ ∗
2𝑦𝑟𝑠	𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒-/ ∗ 𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑-, is the key, which indicates whether, following 
a rezoning, a brownfield is more likely to be redeveloped after 2013 compared to 
what it was before 2013. If the NYC VCP program is effective in incentivizing 
redevelopment in brownfields, we should expect that 𝛽C > 0.  
In addition to these controls, we also add neighborhood fixed effects and year 
fixed effects, or the interaction of the two sets of fixed effects, as controls. By 
including neighborhood fixed effects, the redevelopment rate for each lot is the 
deviation from the neighborhood’s average redevelopment rate over the study 
period. By including year fixed effects, the redevelopment rate for each lot is the 
deviation from the city-wide average redevelopment rate in that year. In other words, 
with both neighborhood fixed effects and fixed effects simultaneously in the 
regressions, the outcome is normalized. We are comparing the normalized 
development rates for brownfields and non-brownfields all over New York City, and 
comparing whether such differences changed before and after 2013.  
Alternatively, we also add neighborhood-by-year fixed effects into the 
regressions. This is the preferred comparison as it is the most granular of the four. 
Under this set of controls, the redevelopment rate is the deviation from the average 
redevelopment rate in each year in each neighborhood. That is, we are comparing 
the redevelopment rate of the brownfields to the rate of the other lots within the same 
neighborhood in the same year. We adopt two definitions of neighborhoods: 
community districts and blocks. There is a larger number of blocks than community 
districts.367 Therefore, we prefer the econometric specification with block-by-year 
fixed effects. Finally, in all the regressions, we weight each plot/observation by its 
area. 
 
                                               
365 Before they are E-designated or receive an ERD, private actors can also identify 
whether they are potentially contaminated (and, therefore, brownfields). 
366 See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 12 (20.81 months on 
average from the time the comment period starts). This is does not include the time needed 
to conduct a remedial investigation which, in the NYC VCP, takes place before the start of 
the comment period. Id. at 12 n. 47.   
367 There were 13,748 blocks and 59 community districts, respectively, in NYC in 2016. 
See Inaraja Vera, Dataset, supra note 357; MAXWELL AUSTENSEN ET AL., N.Y.U. FURMAN 
CTR., STATE OF NEW YORK CITY’S HOUSING AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN 2016, at 141 (2016) 
(listing all community districts in New York City), http://furmancenter.org/files/sotc/SOC_ 
2016_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/KWD8-6HAP]. 
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Results 
 
Table 1: Main Results 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES lag2yrs lag2yrs lag2yrs lag2yrs 
     
Years before rezoning -0.012 -0.005 0.009 -0.023 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.189) (0.290) 
Years after rezoning -0.013 -0.034 0.042 -0.286 
 (0.063) (0.068) (0.046) (0.584) 
Brownfield 0.026 0.165 0.152 0.266 
 (0.362) (0.356) (0.251) (0.236) 
2-Years-Post-rezoning -0.059 0.208 -0.085 1.902 
 (0.152) (0.205) (0.156) (2.065) 
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
2.192*** 2.073*** 2.176*** 2.419*** 
 (0.595) (0.579) (0.492) (0.500) 
Post2013 -0.102  -0.066  












Observations 3,500,055 3,500,055 3,501,095 3,501,095 
R-squared 0.008 0.016 0.104 0.331 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 1 displays the main regression results: Column (1) reports the year fixed 
effects and community district fixed effects; Column (2) reports the community 
district-by-year fixed effects; Column (3) reports the year fixed effects and block 
fixed effects, and Column (4) reports the block-by-year fixed effects. Throughout 
the four specifications, we see that the coefficient for Brownfield is small and 
statistically insignificant. This suggests that lots that have, at any time, been 
designated as brownfields do not have a significantly different redevelopment rate 
than the other lots.  
The coefficient for 2-Years-Post-rezoning is also insignificant, suggesting that 
the post-rezoning years are not associated with higher or lower redevelopment rates. 
However, we see a large and statistically significant coefficient for 
Brownfield*Post-rezoning, which suggests that, after rezoning, the redevelopment 
rate in brownfields increases sharply. This could be explained by the increase in the 
value of the properties after they are up-zoned.368 The coefficient for Post2013 is 
close to zero and insignificant, implying that 2013—approximately two years after 
                                               
368 This entails a change in the zoning to allow higher-value or denser uses. See Up-
zoning, supra note 234. 
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the creation of the NYC VCP—is not a year in which the city-wide redevelopment 
rate changes discontinuously.  
The main coefficient of interest is for Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning. While we find that brownfields are much more likely to be redeveloped 
after a rezoning, we are interested in whether such a relationship changed around 
2013, which reflects the effects of the program. Columns (1) to (4) report different 
results. The only significant estimated coefficient is in Column (3), in which we 
control for the year fixed effects and block fixed effects. Under this specification, 
we are comparing normalized redevelopment rates between the brownfields and 
non-brownfields all over the city. However, when we restrict the comparison to 
brownfields and their nearby non-brownfields within the same block, which is 
shown in Column (4), we see a negative and imprecisely estimated effect. Therefore, 
according to our preferred econometric specification, we do not find evidence that 
there is an effect of the NYC VCP on the redevelopment rate on the brownfields in 
NYC.  
 
Table 2: Timing of the Effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
      
Years before rezoning -0.005 -0.017 -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 
 (0.282) (0.287) (0.289) (0.290) (0.291) 
Years after rezoning -0.265 -0.278 -0.285 -0.286 -0.288 
 (0.579) (0.582) (0.583) (0.584) (0.584) 
Brownfield 0.267 0.267 0.266 0.266 0.266 
 (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) 
2-Years-Post-rezoning 1.850 1.875 1.897 1.902 1.912 
 (2.065) (2.065) (2.065) (2.065) (2.065) 
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
3.708*** 2.872*** 2.503*** 2.419*** 2.315*** 
 (0.910) (0.685) (0.586) (0.500) (0.461) 
Post2010*Brownfield*2-
Years-Post-rezoning 
-1.813*     
 (0.933)     
864 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
Post2011*Brownfield*2-
Years-Post-rezoning 
 -0.850    
  (0.718)    
Post2012*Brownfield*2-
Years-Post-rezoning 
  -0.372   
   (0.666)   
Post2013*Brownfield*2-
Years-Post-rezoning 
   -0.287  
    (0.633)  
Post2014*Brownfield*2-
Years-Post-rezoning 
    -0.069 
     (0.660) 
      
Observations 3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095 3,501,095 
R-squared 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.331 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Table 2, we examine the timing of the effect of the NYC VCP. While the 
program was introduced at the end of 2010 and is expected to have an effect in 2013 
(assuming that the reaction time is approximately two years), it is possible that the 
effects of this program were felt before 2013 (if, for example, real estate developers 
anticipated this policy’s benefits and prioritized developing brownfields 
immediately). The effects of this program could also become apparent after 2013 
because it may have taken some time for many real estate developers to learn about 
this program. In short, it is possible that the NYC VCP was indeed effective when 
we consider a different timing.  
To address this concern, we run a second set of regressions in Table 2, in which 
we experiment with different years—from 2010 to 2014—as the cutoff year. 
Throughout Table 2, we include the block-by-year fixed effects, which is our 
preferred specification. The coefficient of interest is on the triple interaction term. 
We find that, except in 2010, there are no significant changes in the redevelopment 
rate in brownfields following a rezoning in these cutoff years. In 2010, there is 
actually a significant decrease, meaning that brownfields became less likely to be 
redeveloped following a post-2010 rezoning than they did before 2010. In sum, there 
is no significantly positive effect of the NYC VCP on the redevelopment rate on the 
NYC brownfields in either 2013 or the neighboring years. 
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Tables 3 and 4: Effects in an Area with a High Concentration  
of NYC VCP Projects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lag2yrs lag2yrs lag2yrs 
    
Years before rezoning 0.716** 0.978* -0.022 
 (0.310) (0.568) (0.550) 
Years after rezoning 1.656*** 1.844*** 0.183 
 (0.607) (0.700) (0.607) 
Brownfield 0.198 0.836 0.525 
 (0.352) (0.723) (0.613) 
2-Years-Post-rezoning -1.725* -2.646* 1.615 
 (0.964) (1.549) (1.501) 
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning 1.506 2.095** 2.897** 
 (1.220) (1.012) (1.144) 
Post2013 -4.433 -4.466  
 (3.195) (3.072)  
Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning 1.182 1.520 -1.014 
 (1.361) (1.280) (1.377) 
Observations 83,674 83,674 83,674 
R-squared 0.019 0.081 0.384 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
      
Years before rezoning 0.010 -0.006 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.550) (0.550) (0.550) (0.550) (0.551) 
Years after rezoning 0.238 0.222 0.182 0.183 0.184 
 (0.606) (0.604) (0.606) (0.607) (0.607) 
Brownfield 0.518 0.516 0.524 0.525 0.525 
 (0.614) (0.614) (0.613) (0.613) (0.613) 
2-Years-Post-rezoning 1.349 1.312 1.625 1.615 1.606 
 (1.530) (1.565) (1.543) (1.501) (1.507) 
Brownfield*2-Years-Post-rezoning 4.036*** 3.740** 2.889** 2.897** 2.919** 
 (1.508) (1.507) (1.302) (1.144) (1.129) 
Post2010*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
-2.137     
 (1.696)     
Post2011*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
 -1.975    
  (1.604)    
Post2012*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-   -0.725   
866 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 3 
rezoning 
   (1.561)   
Post2013*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
   -1.014  
    (1.377)  
Post2014*Brownfield*2-Years-Post-
rezoning 
    -1.651 
     (1.370) 
      
Observations 83,674 83,674 83,674 83,674 83,674 
R-squared 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.384 0.384 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Tables 3 and 4 we examine whether we can find a statistically significant 
effect in the geographic area in which the program has the highest concentration of 
enrolled projects. While New York City has 59 community districts,369 almost 25% 
of NYC VCP projects are located in one community district, 
Greenpoint/Williamsburg.370 Even in this community district, we find that the 
coefficient for the triple interaction term is not statistically significant, and this result 
holds true even if we use different years—from 2010 to 2014—as our cutoff points. 
                                               
369 See AUSTENSEN ET AL., supra note 367, at 141. 
370 See INARAJA VERA, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR., supra note 21, at 7. 
